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ABSTRACT 
 
This research report is an account of the results of investigations into the critical analysis of the 
private sector’s Financial Sector Charter (FSC) and the government’s Community Reinvestment 
Bill (CRB) in comparing their anticipated advantages towards housing and housing finance for 
the low income sector in South Africa.  2 stages of data gathering were adopted; namely 
interviews   with 5 Banking Council officials and 5 Ministry of Housing officials and a 
questionnaire survey with representatives from SACC, NALEDI, SANGOCO, COSATU and 
SANCO which are independent organizations, which amongst other duties, generally assist in 
serving the social needs of disadvantaged individuals in the society.  Multi-criteria analysis and 
SWOT analysis techniques were used to analyse the qualitative data. 
 
Results showed that the most critical aspect of the FSC is the establishment of risk sharing 
responsibilities between the government and the private sector, which still needs to be resolved.  
The private sector views the CRB as a forceful mechanism with strict requirements, which would 
result in the private sector’s participation in provision of housing finance to the low income sector 
to be ineffective as they would be acting unwillingly. Independent organizations view the CRB as 
being lenient on the private sector.  Evaluation of the CRB and FSC showed that ultimate success 
lies in the combined efforts between the government and private sector, which in turn lies in the 
settling of the Memorandum of Understanding on-going negotiations. 
 
Key recommendations for addressing the low income sector housing and housing finance 
problems include; cultural adjustment of the banks towards low income sector individuals, 
formation of partnerships in dealing with housing and housing finance problems, establishment of 
efficient secondary property markets through amenities provision and infrastructure upgrading, 
identification of effective default management models, accommodation of new intellectual ideas 
and provision of different mortgage securities by banks and the government. 
 
Keywords: Housing, housing finance, low income sector, government, private sector. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Alternative Hypothesis is a hypothesis which is ‘accepted’ if the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
First Order Retail is as defined by Section 2.27 of the FSC. 
 
Hypothesis testing is a procedure where sample data is used to reject or accept a claim, 
opinion, belief or assertion being made about the population. 
 
Null hypothesis is the initial statement of a claim or opinion being made about the 
population (Viruly, 2005). 
 
Redlining is a practice whereby lenders automatically regard homes in certain 
communities or certain census tracts to be ‘unmortgageable’ because of perceived high 
credit risks especially declining property values (Diamond, 2002).  Examples of such 
areas include townships and informal settlements. 
 
Targeted Investment is as defined by Section 2.34 of the FSC. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
 
 
Housing is the bulk of real estate in every country.  Real estate is also the second largest 
cost center for firms, exceeded by labour only.  A poorly functioning real estate market is 
a cost to the rest of the economy.  Although much work has been done on relationships 
between real estate and banking crises in a number of countries, much more work still 
needs to be done, especially in developing countries.  An example is that of South Africa 
where the government has had to step in to resolve problems centred on financial 
institutions providing housing finance to the lower income sector of the society. 
(www.worldbank.org/devforum). 
 
Over half of the consumer debt is usually tied up in home mortgage and a number of 
other financial products bought by consumers at the same time as mortgage is taken out.  
The mortgage market has become one of the most important retail areas for general 
financial institutions.  Non- banking financial services such as insurance and pensions are 
also increasingly drawn into the mortgage market.  Mortgage finance has now firmly 
become part of retail banking from being considered as a separate banking sector. 
Therefore retail banking and mortgage finance have to be dealt with together.  It is 
envisaged that in future all financial services will be obtained under one roof (Ball, 
1990).  Achievement of this level of service implies that different mortgage options will 
be easily available and accessible to cater for any person intending on purchasing a 
house, ranging from high to low income earners of the society.  In South Africa 
negotiations between the government and financial institutions which are providers of 
mortgage, are still taking place.  The government insists on a more regulated and 
transparent mortgage provision system to accommodate the low income sector of the 
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society, who fail in meeting the requirements of lending institutions.  On the other hand 
the financial institutions suggest a free market system whereby the mortgage market is 
not controlled, but rather takes its own form and shape independently. 
 
Basic housing or shelter is a requirement for every human being and the South African 
constitution ---‘Section 26’---stipulates that every South African has a right to adequate 
housing (Mayekiso, 2005) and this goes hand in hand with finding a solution for ensuring 
that this right is fulfilled.  Despite home ownership being referred to as being the 
backbone of a well-functioning society, there are other types of tenure that may be viable 
for housing provision.  An example is that of The United States of America where there 
is owned households, market rental accommodation and public-private low rental 
accommodation (Whitefield, 2002).  The concept of a Community Reinvestment Bill 
addressing the housing finance issue was adopted from the U.S.A. Financial institutions 
raise the argument that the proposed bill is an American concept and is not an ideal 
solution to the problem of housing finance in South Africa. 
 
 
1.2 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE STUDY 
 
 
Prior to 1994, a banking system which existed for the benefit of the “white” minority in 
South Africa in terms of acquisition of housing finance was in place (www.augie.edu).  A 
new political government came into power in 1994 which faced a housing finance system 
which was inherently fragmented and unstable in that, to a great extent it only 
accommodated for the relatively higher income earners of society. In an endeavour to 
normalise the situation of non-provision of housing finance for the low income sector, 
several initiatives were presented by the government, ranging from; the Record of 
Understanding in 1994, the National Housing Code in 1997, the New Deal in 1998 and 
the Home Loan Disclosure  Act (HLMDA) in 2000 (www.augie.edu). For more than half 
a decade the government tried to establish the best solution for availing housing finance 
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to the low to medium income sectors of the society, but this became a far-fetched dream 
as more and more since 1994 have migrated to the cities causing a further demand for 
housing and ultimately a reinforced emphasis on the government to assist in providing 
housing finance. 
 
The Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB was first proposed in 2002 by Parliament. In a 
nut shell, it holds financial institutions accountable for any discriminatory practices 
indicated by the aforementioned HLMDA disclosure office and contributes through 
setting standards for banks to comply with so as to ensure the availability of housing 
credit to low and medium income housing finance borrowers as well as low to medium 
income areas (Diamond, 2002).  
 
The financial sector came up with the Financial Sector Charter, FSC as a contribution to 
the establishment of an equitable society by effectively providing accessible financial 
services to ‘black’ people and by directing it into the targeted sectors of the economy 
(Financial Charter, 2002). 
 
Due to the financial sector having proposed the introduction and establishment of the 
FSC, the government suspended the enactment of the CRB to give the financial sector a 
chance to make a contribution in solving the problem of housing through housing finance 
provision and its accessibility by the low income sector in South Africa. It was reported 
that the banks agreed, during the drafting of the charter, on the provision of about R42 
billion towards housing finance to the R1500 to R7500 a month income sector between 
2002 and 2008 (Sisulu, 2004). To what extent this R42 billion would reduce the housing 
finance problem for the low income sector was not clearly defined. The question that  
arises would be whether the government was diplomatic in allowing the financial sector 
to implement the FSC or enactment of the CRB would have been a more fruitful option in 
dealing with the problem of low income sector housing finance provision. 
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1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
MAIN OBJECTIVE 
The democratic government of South Africa since 1994 has been trying to find a solution 
to housing and housing finance inadequacies.  The current housing backlog is double that 
of the anticipated levels, which is about 2.5 million (Dylan, 2005).  This study is aimed at 
investigating the anticipated implications on housing, of the government’s Community 
Reinvestment Bill, CRB and the financial sector’s Financial Sector Charter, FSC as well 
as identification of possible ways of improvement of housing and its associated financing 
for the low income sector in South African urban areas. 
 
SUB-OBJECTIVES 
 
Research questions handled by the study include the following: 
1. Do housing finance provisions of the Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB and 
those of the Financial Sector Charter, FSC effectively handle expected low 
income housing goals? 
2. Do the voluntary transforming initiatives taken by the Financial Sector and its 
institutions guarantee to bring about more or less benefits for individuals and 
communities than the CRB would secure? 
3. What guidelines should the government or the private sector introduce or follow 
to ensure equitable success to housing infrastructure provision and related 
finance? 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Enactment of the CRB would imply forcing the private sector to act unwillingly and this 
may further hinder the private sector from effectively addressing the financing of low 
income sector housing in South Africa.  While implementation of the FSC would to some 
extent reduce housing shortages in the low income sector. 
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MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
The bringing together of the provisions of both the CRB and the FSC can optimize the 
delivery of the low income financing housing requirements South Africa. 
 
SUB-HYPOTHESES 
The following two sub-hypotheses have been formulated to arrive at the main hypothesis: 
1. The FSC does not provide alternatives should it fail to meet its goals.  The CRB is 
being considered as a policy option should the FSC fail in meeting its goals. 
2. Financial private sector lending institutions are using lending methods 
traditionally aimed for use by the higher income earning sector.  There is a need 
to encourage the design of a range of products suitable for the low income sector. 
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The research was based on the outcomes of the reviews of literature relevant to housing 
as well as the housing finance for the low income sector.  Pilot interviews were 
conducted with a sample of ten representatives from the Banking Association and the 
Ministry of Housing in South Africa.  A questionnaire survey was carried out with a 
sample of six representatives from independent organisations.  The basis for analysis of 
the outcomes from the two stages of practical gathering of data was done by 
implementation of two models namely, multi-criteria analysis model and SWOT analysis 
model as a guideline for refinement of all the results that had already been acquired.  
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1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
 
The chosen area of study is rapidly evolving and changing and hence a definition of the 
time frame is critical. The study and all assessments undertaken were restricted to the 
period ranging from February 2004 to December 2005. 
 
The scope of the discussion was limited to the literature that was published by December 
2005, concerning the on-going negotiations between the government’s Department of 
Housing and the private sector with regards to the issue of housing and housing finance 
for the low income sector in South Africa.  The research is partly based on the views of 
the parties involved in the negotiations, as well as views of some representatives of some 
independent organizations who were knowledgeable about the subject matter and were 
able to bring ‘on board’ sound opinions and interesting arguments. 
 
The study only makes consideration of low to medium income housing finance in urban 
areas and excludes rural areas.  It is entirely qualitative and is therefore limited to views 
and not the actual measurement of implications. 
  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
 
 
The report consists of five chapters. Chapter One is the Introduction which sets out the 
background, need for the study, research objectives and scope of the study. 
 
Chapter Two gives background knowledge on the topic.  Various forms of literature were 
used to acquire a thorough understanding of the topic as well as related issues and 
highlights some of the solutions to the same issue of inadequate housing and insufficient 
housing finance for the low income sector in developing countries.  
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Chapter Three shows the methods used to obtain all data as well as giving a report on 
how the research was carried out.  It also shows methods used for analysis of the data 
obtained. 
 
In chapter Four an analysis of the results obtained from the interviews and questionnaire 
survey is given accompanied by analyses and discussions of the results obtained in line 
with the achievement of the research objectives. 
 
Chapter Five is devoted to conclusions and recommendations reached in the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
 
 
This Chapter contains the theoretical framework that informed this study.  South Africa, 
falls in the category of developing countries therefore an introduction of low income 
housing situations, its funding and related problems prevalent in developing countries is 
given.  An outline of the characteristics of the nature of housing loans and associated 
problems of its acquisition in low income areas is given.  General solutions suggested by 
different authors to tackling these problems are then examined.  Focus on the history and 
progression of the South African low income sector property market since 1994 is 
outlined.  The Government through different initiatives and through the establishment of 
various organizations has played a major role in addressing the issue of housing for the 
low income sector and these have been discussed.  Finally this chapter, focuses on the 
Financial Sector Charter (FSC) and the Community Reinvestment Bill (CRB), in defining 
their role in addressing the issue of housing for the low income sector and its financing.  
A commentary on the views by different authors on the anticipated success of the two 
initiatives by the private sector and the government respectively was given.  A summary 
highlighting the key concepts derived from the literature study rounded up the chapter. 
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2.2 HOUSING FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
 
HOUSING IN DEVELOPING AREAS 
 
In developing countries housing is still considered somewhat of a residual factor. 
Investments in industry and agriculture are given much higher priority because 
governments consider it more important to become economically independent of other 
countries and to create more income for the local people. Once individuals have more 
income, they would be able to afford decent housing. This argument may be largely 
responsible for the lack of policy and planning for housing in most developing countries 
(Diamond, 1997a). This in many parts of the world has led to the birth of houses of 
standards officially unacceptable for human habitation situated in inappropriate locations 
known as shanty towns or squatter camps. These uncontrollable settlements grow in size 
and become more and more difficult to improve, let alone remove. This situation can be 
turned around so as to show that, the existence of such settlements reflects diversity of 
economic activity, perseverance and a sense of entrepreneurship. These positive factors 
can be utilized to produce better houses over a given period of time (Bayer, 1981). 
 
 
GENERAL VIEWS ON HOUSING FINANCE 
 
Areas occupied by low income families are usually characterized by rapid population 
growth, scarce job opportunities, inadequate welfare systems, large uncontrolled 
settlements of substandard housing as well as housing shortages. The problems of 
housing and housing finance are therefore more concentrated in these areas. Housing as 
accepted by all political systems world wide is a social good and therefore cannot be left 
entirely to the market forces to control unlike other non-basic goods that are controlled by 
a free-market system. State intervention via regulation and initiation is as old as mortgage 
finance itself (Ball, 1990).  However it is evident in most countries that the state lacks the 
capacity to undertake the administrative and technical tasks required to make public 
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intervention systems work properly and equitably. In most instances scarce resources 
have been directed towards meeting the needs of a few instead of meeting the needs of 
many (Jorgensen, 1975). 
 
Lea (2005) outlines the problems of housing finance as a common problem in emerging 
housing property markets reflecting lack of appropriate infrastructure and conditions of 
lending. The reasons for these conditions being prevalent in the low income areas are 
attributable to; lower income households not being able to afford housing at market rates 
of interest or house prices, their incomes not being stable or documented, thereby banks 
not assisting them with housing loans or part credit histories may be poor resulting in 
banks failing to trust their potential to repay any housing loans fully and timeously.  
Therefore risks of providing finance to these households is often seen as too high by the 
private sector lenders to participate in. 
 
Both Smith (1995) and Lea (2005) highlight the issue of risks involved in the provision 
of housing finance to the low income sector as being an impediment to provision of 
affordable housing finance although they use different approaches to defining these risks. 
 
Smith’s (1995) framework for analysing residential mortgage risks splits housing finance 
risk into two: 
• Risk of default which is the risk to the banking system of non-performing loans, 
while on the other hand to the borrower it is the risk of over indebtedness and 
repossession.  This can arise as a result of rising interest rates, falling employment 
rates, unemployment, ill-health, disability, loss of the main earner in a household, 
increase in number of dependants etc. 
• Risk of asset depreciation: The defining characteristic of a residential mortgage is 
that it is secured against property.  The sustainability of residential mortgage 
lending depends on the financial value of housing assets being maintained or 
increased in the medium term.  If property values fall, both borrowers and their 
lenders become vulnerable to two risk factors namely, price volatility and asset 
deterioration which result in the risk of asset depreciation.  The risk of asset 
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depreciation is a function of the quality and the condition of the actual housing 
stock, while price volatility is linked to the dynamics of housing as well as land 
and property markets.  It is about how well housing performs as an investment 
and how effectively debts are protected from deflation.  Volatile prices therefore 
imply losses or gains; hence they contain an element of risk. 
 
Meanwhile Lea (2005) classifies the risks associated with housing finance as barriers to 
the provision of housing and considers this only in the context of affordable or generally 
low to medium cost housing.  These risks are as follows: 
• Credit risk: which is the risk to the lending institutions that the funds borrowed 
from them would not be returned with whatever interest or other changes are due 
on a timely basis. 
• Liquidity risk: which is the risk to the borrowers that the money would be needed 
before it is due. 
• Cash-flow risk: is the risk that any changes in the market conditions would alter 
the scheduled cash flow whether real or nominal among the parties involved in 
intermediation, this being the borrower and the lending institution.  This includes 
interest rate risk and exchange rate risk. 
• Agency risk: is the risk that a divergence of interest would cause either the 
lending institution or the borrower to behave in a manner other than that expected 
or agreed on. 
• Systematic risk: is the risk that a crisis at one lending institution or one part of the 
system would spread to the rest of the property market system. 
• Political risk: is the risk that the legal and political framework within which the 
lending takes place would change. 
 
Lending is vastly risky both to the borrower and to the lender as discussed by both Lea 
(2005) and Smith (2005).  Smith (2005) only goes as far as defining from a general 
perspective how this risk can be classified.  With such a limited and general approach 
adopted, it is rather complex to quantify this risk in order to deduce methods of dealing 
with it. Yet Leah (2005) as shown above breaks down the risk into smaller classes in such 
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a way that it is quantifiable.  The ability to manage and price the risks defined above is a 
major determinant of the availability and cost of housing finance as well as the provision 
of credit for affordable housing.  Lea (2005) goes on to highlight how ability to 
successfully manage and control risk depends on the economic stability and an effective 
legal framework for property ownership and mortgage lending. 
 
Porteous (2005) introduces a new and modified approach to the problem of housing 
finance for the low income sector for South Africa.  He opposes the idea of only 
considering current systematic and individual risks affecting an economy in terms of 
housing financing shortages as the only way of solving the problem but also considers the 
effects of apartheid (Section 2.4) and learning from the past would provide a 
comprehensive solution particularly in South Africa.  He firstly commends the laudable 
efforts of the South African government through various initiatives (Section 2.4) such as 
provision of RDP housing, learning from mistakes made, such as the unsustainable nature 
of these houses and development of new ideas of addressing the issue of housing and its 
finance. 
 
The cornerstone approach to dealing with the issue of housing finance according to 
Porteous (2005) lies in solving ‘the interest rate versus price house’ dilemma.  This is 
well illustrated in the following example; 
Assuming a self amortising loan over twenty years (240 months), the resulting interest 
rate being 15% or less.  Until recently rates available to the low income sector home loan 
borrower group have been higher than 15% due to them being riskier lenders. Lately as 
rates have generally fallen, house prices have generally risen. Given that an inverse 
relationship exists between interest rates and house prices, the higher the interest rate the 
lower the house price.  However the calculated monthly installments are relatively high to 
the borrowers.  On the other hand the lower the interest rate the higher the house price 
and the higher the initial payments that have to be paid by the borrower who might not be 
able to afford high initial lump sums.  
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Porteous (2005) expresses the above example as a risk factor both to mortgage lending 
institutions as they would be stuck with borrowers who are unable to afford bond 
repayments due to the high interest rates, if they were to escalate and borrowers have to 
consider taking the risk of financially burdening themselves by possibly having to settle 
for other smaller loans in addition to the mortgage loan to afford the initial payments. 
  
 
2.3 SOLUTIONS TO HOUSING AND HOUSING FINANCE 
PROBLEMS  
 
The two most important pre-requisites for attracting private capital for housing are 
macroeconomic stability and an effective legal framework for property ownership and 
mortgage lending Lea (2005).  Macroeconomic stability is very important for several 
reasons.  It has a major effect on the demand for mortgages.  High rates of inflation and 
nominal interest rates are typical features of unstable economies which are also termed 
volatile economies and these features in turn have the effect of reducing the affordability 
of conventional mortgages.  This occurs due to borrowers being exposed to rapidly 
varying interest rates caused by the unstable economy which may subject borrowers to 
potential shock and hence affordability problems.  A volatile economy also affects the 
supply of funds and the characteristics of mortgages offered by lenders.  In a volatile 
environment lenders are concerned about the risk that the borrowers may not pay debt 
repayments timeously as discussed above, since unstable economies promote impulsive 
spending.  Hence lenders become more reluctant to offer long term loans such as housing 
loans.  This may lead them to not offering mortgages or loans that in turn are less 
affordable to borrowers.  Lenders and investors may prefer short term assets, in part 
because of the difficulties of forecasting inflation and interest rates.  Investors must be 
able to forecast cash-flows with a tolerable level of variance in order to price and 
evaluate the risk of the investments.  Variable rate mortgages are riskier for borrowers in 
a volatile environment as interest rates change causes payment shocks.  In turn, this 
increases the risk of mortgage lending by lending institutions (Lea, 2005). 
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Concerning the issue of acquiring an effective legal framework for property ownership 
and mortgage lending Lea (2005) identifies issues related to land titles as a major barrier 
to housing finance in developing countries in general, of which South Africa falls into 
this category.  A distinguishing characteristic of housing finance is the ability to put up 
the subject property as security of the loan.  In most countries there are often legal 
impediments to the ability of a property owner to pledge residential property as collateral 
such as the consent to the loss of property in the case of default regardless of the amount 
of repayments made.  Therefore an accurate and comprehensive land registration system 
is a necessary condition for effective title property rights (Lea, 2005). 
 
In South Africa an economic climate of rather low and stable interest rates is prevalent.  
Lea (2005) states one of the failures of attracting private capital by individuals in housing 
markets as being macroeconomic instability. Consideration of volatile economies is made 
and therefore is currently not applicable to this study, but it would be necessary in 
forecasting and consideration of such a situation unexpectedly arising.  This approach can 
not be completely ignored.  While the issue of the legal framework affecting access to 
housing finance especially for the low income sector is essential for consideration as this 
is currently applicable to the South African situation. 
 
Similarly Porteous (2005) agrees on the issue of securitisation being an impediment to 
acquisition of housing finance by the low income sector individuals, but also points out 
how the organisation, SA Home Loans since 1998 has been issuing mortgage backed 
securities.  This ensures that defaulting on home loan repayments by the low income 
sector individuals is minimised. 
 
Focusing on the South African low income sector housing situation, Porteous (2005) also 
points out how banks have developed a housing loan secured by a guarantee from a 
worker’s retirement fund as a means of offering larger loans at lower income rates which 
is a part-solution to the dilemma mentioned in the example above. 
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On a more general note, it should be noted that the solution to housing shortages in low 
income areas not only lies in availing housing finance to the low income sector 
individuals, but other issues such as extension of supply of housing that conforms to 
differentiated types of demand in this sector.   This involves further categorising the low 
income sector and attending specifically to the housing needs of each category in the low 
income sector as opposed to putting the whole sector under one common umbrella 
(Jorgensen, 1975)   
 
It is essential to have the local groups of low income communities encouraged to play an 
active role in the service delivery of housing.  Their involvement explicitly addresses the 
nature of their problems, at all stages of service delivery.  Problems faced by these 
communities are not always pecuniary in nature but may include insufficient provision of 
roads, hospitals, schools, that may impede on general community development in these 
areas.  This also has a negative impact on housing delivery.  Formation of cooperatives is 
advisable as it ensures involvement of individuals in these areas.  It also addresses other 
problems such as high unemployment levels which are a common characteristic of low 
income areas.  Financial lending institutions suitable for such areas such as Building 
societies are an example of a solution for housing finance services in the form of 
cooperatives (Baken, 1992). 
 
On the one hand home ownership is the backbone of well-functioning societies and on 
the other it may be considered as an important aspect of individual capital accumulation.  
Home ownership flourishes when it is part of a range of housing choices that include 
market rental accommodation and affordable public-private low-rental accommodation. 
Having a rather smooth flowing secondary market is also a target of ensuring housing 
market.  An example is that of the United States of America, USA, where, there are three 
types of tenure; 65% of all households own the accommodation in which they live, 25% 
live in market rental accommodation and 10% live in affordable public-private low rental 
accommodation ( Whitfield, 2002).  This point is argued out by Porteous (2005) who 
points out how demand for rental accommodation has increased since 1994 and mentions 
how the South African government has been encouraging social rental housing through 
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the provision of affordable rental accommodation.  More than 30 social rental housing 
institutions are currently in existence. 
Formation of different lending institutions that continuously adjust their strategic roles to 
new circumstances for the benefit of the borrowers is another point of consideration.  In 
some countries new institutions have muscled into mortgage markets sometimes even 
threatening the existence of traditional lenders.  The world of mortgage markets has 
changed drastically in the last two decades.  House mortgages have become one of the 
keystones of the much-talked about financial supermarkets of the future.  The flow of 
funds into housing finance has become internationalised with mortgage backed securities 
and bonds increasingly traded on and between the major financial centres and large scale 
loans raised within the Euro markets.  Financial systems of different countries are still 
very different despite widespread deregulation.  Mortgage finance and its institutional 
frameworks are no exception because housing markets vary considerably between 
countries, there is therefore little likelihood of standardized systems of mortgage finance 
arising internationally in the near future (Ball, 1990). 
 
Insurance can be tied up to a housing loan, which serves to cover against default on the 
loan repayments.  This type of loan is known as an insurance tied loan and can be paid 
together with loan interests at a fixed or variable rate over the loan repayment period.  
Payment of this insurance secures both the borrower and the lender in the case of the 
borrower’s failure to complete the loan the loan repayments.  The argument that may 
arise with this type of loan is the ability of low income sector individuals in going an 
extra mile financially when they barely make it to affording regular loan repayments 
(Jorgensen, 1975).  
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2.4 S.A. LOW INCOME SECTOR HOUSING MARKET 
 
 
In October 1994 a Record of Understanding, ROU between the former Association of 
Mortgage Bankers and the Department of Housing was signed.  This was done in an 
endeavour to address issues of provision of housing finance to all sectors of housing 
nationwide, more specifically the low income sector.  The ROU was terminated in 1996.  
On the 1st of April 1998 a New Deal between the Banking Council, Department of 
Housing and the MIF, Multi-Lateral Investment Fund, was signed in the same year to 
address issues that had been abandoned by the previously signed ROU.  In terms of the 
two agreements repossessed properties with non-performing loans, which is loans not 
being repaid, as at 31 August 1997 and which were not rectified by May 1998 were to be 
placed in a portfolio management by an organisation, Servcon.  This was done to assist in 
partly stabilising the low income sector housing market through a payment normalisation 
strategy.  The rehabilitation strategy involved working around sale, rescheduling and 
rightsizing of loans.  Servcon was to handle this process till 31 March 2006. 
 
National Housing Finance Corporation, NHFC and National Urban Reconstruction 
Housing Agency, NURCHA came into the picture as an initiative to gear up expansion of 
provision for finance to services in the housing market.  The role of NHFC was to 
provide loans, guarantees and other products to financial lenders in the low income 
sector.  On the other hand, NURCHA provided guarantees and finance services to 
individual borrowers in the housing market as a whole.  Until the year 2000 the private 
sector had not yet made a contribution towards assisting in the problem of housing or 
housing finance inadequacies in the low income sector.  A method had to be formulated 
to acquire involvement of financial institutions to this situation that had yet again been 
neglected (Mthembi-Mahanyele, 2000). 
 
The government saw a need to force banks back into this market as a result of legislative, 
political, environmental and socio-economic needs of the country.  The housing 
 18
challenge was too big for the government to handle on its own so it needed the private 
sector to assist all for the benefit of the nation.  Following this realisation the first piece 
of legislation to be released was the Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act which 
attempted to identify any possible discriminatory lending patterns by financial institutions 
such as redlining (Definition of terms, pg x).  Much work still needs to be done in terms 
of research to identify and assess the actual impact of the HLMDA with regards to 
eradication of such practices such as redlining.  After the HLMDA, the Community 
Reinvestment Bill, CRB, was produced and set aside before being released as a result of 
the FSC to give financial institutions a chance to perform before enforcing the CRB as an 
Act (Sisulu, 2004). 
 
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 
 
The NHFC, a developmental agency was established in May 1996 with the aim to 
facilitate access to housing credit by people who had been serviced by conventional 
banks. Its eminent goals being promotion of housing credit to an estimated 20% to 30% 
of South African households with low to moderate income families which could not 
access housing finance. NHFC sought to provide affordable housing solutions to the 
country’s poor.  NHFC’s commitment was that of ensuring that every employed citizen 
has access to finance credit within their means, to acquire or to improve adequate housing 
for their families.  The NHFC was successful in delivering, amongst others, the 
following: 
• More than R1bn in approvals and a record amount of R800m disbursed.  These 
funds were used to erect more than sixty two thousand subsidy linked new 
housing units and granting of end user loans to more than for hundred and twenty 
thousand low income families countrywide.  This was achieved through linkages 
with accredited lenders such as Southfin, and building material suppliers like 
Bonus Building Suppliers and small banks like Unibank, Saambou and others. 
• NHFCs primary mandate of breaking barriers that stand in the way of low income 
earners’ ability to access housing finance was achieved by changing the lives of 
the poor and in so doing two million benefited from this process. 
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• Helped to establish and capacitate a total of twenty nine new Start-Up and 
Emerging Lenders as well as Social Housing institutions. In so doing, eight 
previously disadvantaged lenders were trained and brought on board.  A total of 
five women lenders are now operating in their own communities and four other 
housing institutions have been capacitated. 
• Changed views on myths centred on default on loan repayments in the low 
income sector, by building this market’s ability to manage funds, risk and through 
its funding, encouragement of the need of being prudent and transparent in 
funding activities of the lending institutions in this market. 
• Managed to decrease Cost to- Income ratio required to register for loan 
application in the low income sector, from 50% to 20%. 
• Through one of its subsidiaries, Gateway, NHFC was able to secure private sector 
equity investment from two institutional investors.  In the year 2000 for instance, 
Gateway made available R50 million to one of the small banks for the funding of 
one thousand and two hundred housing units.  NHFC, through its own equity fund 
as able to fund the formation and capacitating of venture capitalist and previously 
disadvantaged and women entrepreneurs to a value of R18m (Mthembi-
Mahanyele, 2000). 
 
THE CURRENT LOW-INCOME SECTOR HOUSING SITUATION 
 
The exodus to urban areas of rural people, since 1994 had not caused an obvious shortage 
in housing but the mushrooming of informal settlements has given a clear indication of 
apparent housing shortages accompanied by shortages of housing finance. Another trend 
that has been rather apparent is that of “de-densification”. Due to the desire of families 
wanting to live independently have led to split of what used be large extended families 
staying in one unit.  This set up has become less and less common and has also led to an 
increase in housing shortages in low income areas.  Therefore the major challenge for the 
FSC was to devise reachable lending targets and methods for increasing affordable 
housing. 
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Table 2.1:  Classification of Household Income Groups in South Africa  
Error! Not a valid link. 
Source: The Issue on Housing in the low Income Sector Property Market in 
S.A (Source: Dylan, 2005) 
 
It should be noted that the South African population is approximated at forty five million 
with ten and a half million households.  About ten million people have formal 
employment and about sixteen million use credit facilities of some kind.  The above first 
two categories are assumed to be deriving income from formal employment and therefore 
represent the conventional markets.  There is a need to design products appropriate for 
the last two categories in the above table thereby allowing penetration of the conventional 
markets by individuals from the other two categories.  The government expresses the 
need for the FSC to define who bears the risk of failure of non payment by the low 
income sector individuals and how such risks should be allocated between public and 
non-public sectors.  The government also suggests that increased penetration of the 
conventional property markets would bring about normalisation of non performing 
markets, which are the low income sector markets.  Normalisation in this instance refers 
to low income sector property markets achieving the same level of performance and 
activity as the higher income property markets.  In addition to this increased provision of 
finance for these markets as well as transparent performance measurement of housing 
finance institutions would yet be another positive feature towards normalisation of these 
markets.  In terms of the FSC, CEOs  (Refer to Appendix I)  of the banks have agreed, 
during the drafting of the charter on the provision of about R42 billion towards housing 
finance to the R1500 to R7500 a month income sector between 2002 and 2008 (Sisulu, 
2004). 
 
Despite the efforts of the South African government the poorest of households earn less 
than 10% of the total income earned by all South Africans, and the richest top 10% earn 
more than half of the total income (Mpofu, 1999).  This implies a huge gap between the 
low income and high income sectors of society which is a common characteristic of 
developing countries.  Lack of available housing stock in the R60 000 to R100 000 
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bracket has impacted adversely on the potential growth of the secondary housing market 
for both low and lower middle income groups (Diagram 2.1).  The housing department 
has been continuously challenging the private sector to build houses for this category of 
earners bearing in mind the favourable interest rates phase the country has been still 
experiencing over the past three years (Mpofu, 1999). 
 
The banking sector still remains sophisticated and largely able to service the housing 
finance needs of the relatively more well-off households in South Africa (Mpofu, 1999). 
 
Historically, housing was one of the instruments used by the government for 
implementation of policy of separate development.  In areas outside the homelands, the 
majority of people were deprived of ownership and property rights (Bay Research & 
Consultancy Services, 2002). 
 
From the early 1900s African Township property markets have been characterized by 
changing laws pertaining to rights being away at different times over the last a hundred 
years, poor social infrastructure and service delivery as a result of the fact that up to 
1980, townships for Africans were seen as temporary areas, poor and limited housing 
delivery, often at inappropriately high standards which resulted in housing shortages and 
overcrowding.  All of these factors have resulted in creation of a particular housing 
market with unique characteristics.’ 
 
Thus the following issues have been discussed: 
• A shortage of overall housing in low income areas exists brought about by a 
shortage of housing in the secondary market.  A secondary housing market is a 
market in which houses are freely bought and sold.  Over the last five years there 
has been a reduction in the numbers of RDP housing projects being undertaken.  
Supply of housing has generally reduced as a result of various problems related to 
access of development finance and subsidy erosion through inflation.  These 
problems indicate a stagnating primary market and therefore an interrupted flow 
of the secondary housing market in these areas.  
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• In 2004 townships had about 2.28 million households in their residential property 
market.  While this market is functioning at expected levels, this creates ‘dead 
capital’ in the hands of the owners.  This means that the property owners have 
properties that they possess with market values that are close to zero as they can’t 
sell them off.  During the apartheid era Black Townships operated as a closed 
market, this means that only residents of the township could buy and sell houses 
in these areas without outsiders being involved in the buying and selling of this 
residential stock.  In addition to this, these townships received poor infrastructure 
and services.  This directly influenced the way in which housing is delivered and 
property is valued and traded in these areas.  An interesting and sideling thought 
is the issue of personal (sentimental) value versus the market value of the 
property.  The former always seems to outweigh the latter and further studies have 
to be carried out regarding the influence of these issues on the secondary 
residential property market in low income areas. 
 
Therefore in addressing the issues of total contribution of financial institutions in the 
form of the FSC, the government requires them to include methods of complete 
eradication of the aforementioned historically set patterns in the townships (Bay Research 
& Consultancy Services, 2002). 
 
LOW INCOME HOUSING SERVICING TENDENCIES 
 
The well known and well established International Housing Finance Services, IHFS, 
Fannie Mae, conducted a study to identify practices in the South African low income 
housing loan servicing by financial institutions and reported on their findings: 
Banks believe that they are effectively reaching out to the low income households and 
claim that they have supporting statistical information in relation to this claim.  In 
opposition to this claim, it was found that few institutions have in existence a branch 
presence targeted at low income households.  In addition to this methods of 
communication that have proven to be effective for the middle and upper end of the 
market are being used with the low income sector.  These methods are ineffective in 
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reaching out to the low income individuals as they are less educated and obviously 
require a method of communication that takes into account their various disadvantages.  
It was also found that most institutions rely mostly on ‘automatic payroll deduction’ as 
their only source of borrowers’ financial status.  These prove to be ‘inadequate collection 
services’ as incomes of these individuals are not entirely dependant on payroll 
information, a considerable proportion of these individuals are in informal employment 
(Fannie Mae, 2004). 
 
In area management practices, the report states that banks fail to inform borrowers of the 
full-extent of suitable options for them and that lenders lack the ability to contact 
borrowers earlier in the default management process and that most lenders lack models 
that predict borrower default.  The following conclusions were therefore drawn: 
• Interviewed South African financial lending institutions do not illustrate early 
default management policies and practices that encouraged borrowers to neither 
contact the lender early when they first encounter financial hardship, nor do 
institutions pro-actively follow up with borrowers when loans first become 
remiss.  The lack of a trusting relationship between low income housing loan 
services and low income borrowers prevents South African services from 
implementing best practices in low income housing loan arrears management 
(Fannie Mae, 2004). 
• The ability of collection staff to develop ‘trusting relationships’ with borrowers 
greatly improves their ability to work with the borrowers to resolve loans that 
would have fallen into arrears.  Yet the main objective of these employees in 
financial lending institutions should be to ensure that eviction is the last resort for 
borrowers that have fallen into arrears.  These individuals should be empathetic to 
the circumstances of the low income sector individuals.  The majority of the 
interviewed institutions do not currently employ a ‘collections staff’ that 
possesses these qualities.  In addition most interviewed institutions have 
centralised this function, which works well from a control perspective but is not 
effective from a perspective of building a client relationship (Fannie Mae, 2004). 
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The report identifies problems in the lending services given by financial lending 
institutions and highlights ways of improvement based on these findings. 
 
 
2.5 THE CRB AND THE FSC: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR CHARTER 
 
The Financial Services Charter is among the various charters that have been introduced 
by the financial sector in response to the government’s attempt to encourage financial 
institutions to embrace its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy through the 
Community Reinvestment Bill, particularly as far as access to housing finance was 
concerned.  At the NEDLAC Financial Sector Summit, held in August 2002, the 
Financial Sector committed itself to the development of the financial services charter to 
cause suspension of the government’s enactment of the Community Reinvestment Bill 
(www.cliffedekker.co.za).  
The Financial Sector made the committment to develop the financial services charter on 
the grounds that:  
• Despite significant progress since the establishment of a democratic government 
in 1994, South Africa was still characterised by racially based income and social 
inequalities, a factor that hampers the country’s ability to achieve its full 
economic potential.  
• Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a mechanism aimed at addressing 
inequalities and mobilising the energy of all South Africans.  It should contribute 
towards sustained economic growth, development and social transformation in 
South Africa.  
• Inequalities also manifest themselves in the country’s financial sector. A positive 
and proactive response from the sector through the implementation of BEE will 
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further unlock the sector’s potential, promote its global competitiveness and 
enhance its world class status. 
• Equally, the financial stability and soundness of the financial sector and its 
capacity to facilitate domestic and international commerce is central to the 
successful implementation of BEE (www.southafrica.info). 
 
The logic behind the establishment of the Financial Services Charter was to ensure a 
commitment of the financial sector to actively promote a transformed, vibrant and 
globally competitive financial services sector that reflects the demographics of South 
Africa.  The financial services sector committed itself to establishing a service delivery 
system less afflicted by inequality, but one that is competitive and able to provide 
accessible financial services to the previously disadvantaged communities and to direct 
investment to targeted sectors of the economy (Herzenburg, 2005).  Furthermore, the 
financial services sector committed itself to investing in the housing market by 
developing policies that would allow for better access to housing by the lower income 
end of the market.  
 
Below are some key points about the FSC: 
• Voluntarily developed by the financial sector. 
• Transformation Charter as contemplated in the Broad-Based BEE Legislation. 
• Constitutes a framework and establishes the principles upon which BEE will be 
implemented in the financial sector.  
• Represents a partnership programme as outlined by Government’s strategy for 
Broad-Based BEE. 
• Provides the basis for the sector’s engagement with other stakeholders including 
Government and Labour. 
• Establishes targets and unqualified responsibilities in respect of each principle and  
• Outlines processes for implementing the character and mechanisms to monitor 
and report on progress (Bond, 2000). 
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THE FINANCIAL SECTOR CHARTER TARGETED INVESTMENT AREAS 
 
The charter’s area of concern amongst other objectives is mostly debt financing, any 
other forms of credit extension, equity investment in South African projects in areas 
where gaps or backlogs in economic development have been accrued and job creation, 
have not been adequately addressed by financial institutions. It specifically focuses on 
financing investment in: 
• Transformational infrastructure projects that support economic development in 
underdeveloped areas and contribute towards equitable access to economic 
resources. 
• Agricultural developments involving integrated support for resource-poor farmers 
through enabling access to and the sustainable use of resources. 
• Low-income housing for households in the monthly income brackets, between R1 
500 and R3 500 and between R3 500 and R7 000. This income band is to be 
increased in line with the CPIX on the first of January each year commencing on 
the first of January 2004 (www.cliffedekker.co.za).  
The sections of the FSC that are most applicable to this study are: 
Section 8.3.2 of the FSC: This makes reference to the home loan and all those entitled to 
receiving it, typically all those that fall in the low income sector.  The FSC only makes 
consideration of the R1500.00 to R7000.00 income bracket as the lower R500 to R1 500 
bracket is wholly taken care of by government’s subsidies (Diagram 2.1). 
Section 9.1.3.3 of the FSC: Refers to the risk mitigating measures and risk sharing 
arrangements between the Government and its DFIs on one side and the private sector on 
the other side.  This may be the ultimate solution to the problem of finance for low 
income housing once the risk related issues between the two parties are settled.  On-going 
negotiations are still taking place and are centred on finding an optimum solution that 
satisfies both parties. 
 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT BILL 
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The CRB, as its main objective is specifically intended for provision of the minimum 
targets of lending for low and medium income households, for housing purposes and any 
associated issues. The CRB in its preamble bases its purpose on the need, according to 
the country’s constitution, for everyone having the basic human right of having access to 
adequate housing.  Therefore the state has to play a major role in ensuring compliance 
with this clause in the constitution.  Also included in the preamble is the mention of the 
foundation laid by the HLMDA in the year 2000 (as discussed above).  An office will be 
established to, assess, monitor and evaluate the financial institutions with regards to them 
meeting the objectives of the CRB. This office has to report to the minister of housing 
and the public to ensure transparency in the execution of its duties.  The CRB gives an 
outline of the duties to be carried out by this office.  A list of detailed and specific 
requirements and rules to be followed by the financial institutions in their borrowing 
practices and related issues as well as reinforcement of previously laid HLMDA rules 
such as eradication of ‘redlining’ (Definition of Terms, pg x) are provided.  Financial 
institutions are given a clear indication of the manner in which lending to the low income 
sector has to be carried out in section 4 of the CRB.  For the assessment of performance 
and monitoring of the financial institutions, sections 5, 6 and 7 of the CRB give the 
reporting requirements and methods of performance rating, as prescribed by the minister 
of housing.  It is also required that written assessment of the financial institutions should 
be made by the office be kept as a record.  The minister of housing is to consult with the 
ministers of finance, justice and trade an industry to ensure compliance with established 
statutes in terms of the CRB if or when it is passed as an Act.  Exemptions and specific 
offences and penalties are given with regards to the non-compliance with the CRB by 
financial institutions in section 10 and 11 (SA Government, 1999). 
 
 
2.6 ANALYSES OF THE CRB AND THE FSC  
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Although the Community Reinvestment Bill has been suspended by government because 
of the Financial Sector Charter protests at the strict nature of the bill and subsequent 
proactive action in developing the Financial Services Charter as an alternative to the Bill; 
it remains an important document that can be reactivated at any time should financial 
institutions fail to fulfill their obligations as set out in the financial services charter.  It is 
therefore, a critical document that should form part of any discussion on housing finance 
in South Africa (Mayekiso, 2005).  The government realised that the crisis in housing 
delivery was partly due to financial institutions’ failure to invest and provide access to 
housing finance to previously disadvantaged communities; including the banks tendency 
to redline (refer to Appendix I)  communities on the perception that it was risky to recoup 
investments should individuals default (Bond, 2000).  This resulted in a decrease in 
private sector investment in the lower end of the housing market in 2002.  This indication 
led to the drafting of the Community Reinvestment (Housing) Bill. The Bill aims at 
giving effect to the Constitutional right of access to adequate housing (Section 26 (1), in 
relation to and the State’s obligation (Section 26 (2) of the Constitution) (www.gov.za).  
 
According to these provisions, the state is obliged to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right 
to adequate housing.  The right of access to adequate housing, as envisaged in the 
constitution, suggests provision of more than just a roof over one’s head. Therefore it 
means that adequate housing must be accessible to everyone without discrimination of 
any kind.  
 
This could be achieved through making housing subsidies and finance available and by 
protecting the “poor” from unreasonable restrictions that impinge on their access to 
housing finance.  The Bill is aimed at expanding access to finance, thereby boosting 
housing opportunities for low and medium income households (Mayekiso, 2005).  
 
The Bill intends to move beyond the disclosure of information regarding home loans, as 
required by the Home Loan Mortgage Disclosure Act of 2000.  It compels all financial 
institutions to engage in the provision of home loans to make finance available to the 
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lower end of the home loan market.  Banks were required to set aside a portion of their 
funding to meet the needs of low and medium income households in accessing home loan 
finance (Streek, 2001).  
 
The drafting of the Bill has been an important step towards fulfilling the state’s obligation 
to provide adequate housing for every South African citizen in that it compelled financial 
institutions to draft the financial sector charter. If however the financial sector had not 
presented the charter then that may have possibly led to the enactment of Bill.  It is 
critical to ensuring that all South Africans are afforded access to finance for housing.  
The Bill significantly forbids the practice of ‘redlining’ and encourages real investment 
and development of poor communities.  Such developments are concerned with ensuring 
equitable access to resources and opportunities that should increase people’s standards of 
living and destroy the barriers that impede access to housing rights 
(www.africacnccl.org). 
 
Basically, the Bill places positive obligations on private institutions to respond to social 
development needs through providing home loans to low and middle income earners.  To 
achieve its purpose, the Bill establishes certain principles, targets and standards that need 
to be fulfilled by these financial institutions. These include: 
• Refraining from refusing home loan finance purely on the grounds of socio-
economic characteristics of the neighborhood in which the home is located.  
• Refraining from the practice of redlining unless it is dictated by safe and sound 
business practice.  
• Ensuring that borrowers know the outcome of their applications and if rejected 
they are also furnished with reasons why their applications were unsuccessful 
(www.gov.za).  
 
If a financial institution is unable to meet the above mentioned standards by lending 
directly to the applicants, it is obliged to seek certain alternative forms of lending for 
them, including: 
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• Providing funding through prescribed wholesale lenders at a mutually agreed 
interest rate. 
• Purchasing such wholesale lenders’ securities and debt issues; and  
• Providing funding directly to market lenders for them to make the funds available 
as loans.  
 
The Bill specifically stipulates that financial institutions must not provide home loans in 
certain circumstances, for example, they must not provide a bond without due regard to a 
borrowers ability to repay it.  This means that those who may not be able to repay home 
loans may be reasonably refused access to them (www.gov.za).  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.5 above, the Bill forbids ‘redlining’ unless it is reasonably 
justifiable in terms of ‘sound business principle or business necessity’.  However the Bill 
is vague in properly defining the meaning of ‘sound business principles’ and ‘business 
necessity’. These terms are arguably susceptible to abuse by financial institutions as a 
justification for excluding certain people from accessing home loans.  Their open-ended 
nature may render the principle of forbidding redlining ineffective 
(www.gpghousing.org.za).  
 
The Bill proposes that financial institutions that do not comply with its requirements 
should be liable for payment of fines not exceeding R 500 000 as a penalty for non-
compliance.  The institutional mechanisms and procedures outlined in the Bill will have 
positive consequences in terms of holding financial institutions accountable for 
facilitating access to home loans to low-income earners (Herzenburg, 2003).  However, 
its offence provisions are a cause for concern as they are ambiguous and do not specify 
what penalties are to be applied in the event of repeated offences. In particular the fine of 
a specified amount might be perceived by banks as negligible, compared to the risk 
involved in extending loans to poor communities.  Hence there is fear that such fines will 
become merely a business expense as redlining continues. 
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THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE FINANCIAL SECTOR CHARTER  
 
The South African financial sector, despite generally being recognised as “world class in 
terms of its skilled workforce, adequate capital resources, infrastructure and technology 
as well as a conducive operating, regulatory and supervisory environment, remains 
uneven in terms of its investment strategies and failure to deal with the issue of 
previously disadvantaged communities continuing to be marginalised in terms of 
investments. The following is an example of the crisis: 
• There is a low level of black participation, especially of black women, in 
meaningful ownership, control and management, and high-level skilled positions 
in the sector. 
• There has been an inadequate response by the sector to the increasing demand for 
access to financial services. 
• The sector has not effectively provided credit to entrepreneurs, particularly black 
businesses. 
• The national level of savings and investment is inadequate to support sustained 
economic growth and individual financial security.  
• There is insufficient investment of the savings pool under the control of the sector 
into targeted investments of national priority. 
• A large pool of funds circulates outside the formal financial system, including 
unlimited funds held by “stokvels”, informal traders and other forms of short-term 
savings (www.gpghousing.org.za).  
The financial services sector can contribute significantly towards economic growth, 
development, empowerment, poverty alleviation and job creation if they develop forward 
looking policies and strategies (Sassen, 1991).  The financial services sector, however, 
acknowledges that access to first-order retail (Definition of Terms, pg x) and financial 
services is fundamental to Black Economic Empowerment and to the development of 
South Africa’s economy as a whole. The attempt to set up the Financial Services Charter 
is a positive example of the sector’s commitment to change and transformation. 
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In terms of the Declaration of the Financial Sector Summit on the 20th of August 2002, it 
was agreed that strategies would be put in place to ensure that the financial sector is more 
efficient in the delivery of financial services, which enhances the accumulation of savings 
and directs them towards development initiatives, such as housing finance 
(www.archtetafrica.com).   
 
The charter also states that; in accordance with the arrangements between the financial 
sector, government and other stakeholders, various loans including low- income housing 
loans, agricultural loans and loans to black SME’s (Definition of Terms, pg x)will be 
granted by the sector to  individuals and organizations who meet the sector’s  specified 
criteria.  
 
 
 
THE FSC’S CORPORATE SOCIAL INVESTMENT (CSI) INITIATIVE 
 
One of the requirements of the charter is that each financial institution has a target of 
directing 0.5 per cent per annum of its post tax operating profits to Corporate Social 
Investment (CSI) (Herzenburg, 2003).  CSI refers to projects aimed primarily at black 
groups, communities and individuals that have a strong developmental approach and 
contribute towards socio- economic transformation. CSI projects, as stated in the charter, 
may include but will not be limited to: 
• Education: Support for community education facilities, programmers at secondary 
and tertiary education level aimed at promoting the industry, bursaries and 
scholarships, which are oriented towards the hard sciences. 
• Development Programmes: Intended for youth and other target groups. 
• Environment: Support for conservation projects, community clean up projects, 
food garden initiatives. 
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• Job Creation: Job creation projects external to the workplace or any commitments 
contained in empowerment financing. 
• Arts and Culture: Support of development programmes, development of new 
talent 
• Health: Support of community clinics, health programmes in the community and; 
• Sport: Support of development programmes. 
Housing is not only providing a roof over people’s heads but creating functional, self 
contained and sustainable communities.  It is critical therefore that the financial services 
sector invests in these service areas as well (Bond, 2000). Therefore this shows that the 
financial sector not only aimed at assisting towards housing finance provision to the low 
income sector but also creation of self contained and well functioning and sustainable 
economies in  low income communities as a whole though CSI. 
 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN FSC AND BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
 
In an attempt to encourage Black Economic Empowerment, the government passed the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2004. The Act advocates both direct 
and indirect empowerment, direct empowerment, as defined in the Act, entails the 
promotion of ownership and management control of business by black persons and 
human resource development, including employment equity and skills development. 
 
Indirect empowerment on the other hand refers to enterprise development through 
investing and joint venturing with black empowered or black owned companies, or 
investing in the development of small, micro and medium enterprises, affirmative 
procurement of goods and services and Corporate Social Investment. Indirect 
procurement of goods and services talks to the housing finance issue. It basically means 
that institutions and companies are compelled, especially non-black owned, to play a role 
in the provision of goods and services such as housing and infrastructural service to 
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previously disadvantaged unemployed or low income earners who cannot afford the 
services on their salaries (Herzenburg, 2003).  
 
The Act also enables the Minister to recognize industry based charters which are 
developed voluntarily, on how black economic empowerment would be achieved in each 
of these industrial sectors, over an identified period of time.  The Financial Services 
Sector, undoubtedly, has a significant influence on the economy, and as a result, is 
expected to have far reaching effects.  It sets targets for black empowerment in the 
financial sector and simultaneously allows banks to meet part of their obligation by 
lending into the low end of the housing market (www.cliffedekker.co.za). 
 
Equity transactions have resulted in a few low income sector enterprises becoming 
extremely wealthy, giving rise to the development of a few large black business 
conglomerates, which in itself is necessary in a normally functioning economy.  However 
this has not resulted in bringing required levels of low income sector people into the 
mainstream of the economy.  This is where skills development, employment equity, 
enterprise development, affirmative procurement and possibly corporate social 
investment become critical (Diamond, 1997b). 
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ CONCERN ABOUT THE CRB 
 
The Community Reinvestment Bill basically sets some targets to be met by financial 
institutions.  These targets stipulate that banks must provide mortgages to a specific 
number of people, a figure that would be decided upon by the Minister of Housing. 
Banks argued that such targets would force them to make loans to people who may not be 
able to afford to repay them which would constitute bad business practice.  The banks 
criticised the notion of punitive measures designed for lack of compliance with the set 
requirements of the Bill and failure of the Bill to include incentives for banks complying 
with its requirements (www.southafrica.info).  
 
The financial sector argues that reckless lending will not solve the problem of housing 
finance, but instead will exacerbate it.  Poverty ultimately increases through defaulting on 
loans.  Banks perceive most people in the low income sector as not having the financial 
stability to finance land acquisition through incurring debt.  Banks have further expressed 
the need to investigate alternative forms of land tenure arguing that home ownership 
financed by debt may not necessarily be appropriate for poor communities 
(www.cliffedekker.co.za).  
 
Institutions have particularly highlighted their inability to act on behalf of defaulters due 
to robust community action against corrective measures such as repossession. 
Unemployment and the breakdown of the rule of law in certain areas, makes the 
implementation of new loans extremely difficult (Diamond, 1995).  Under these 
circumstances prescribing certain levels of lending can also amount to inappropriate 
lending with negative consequences.  
 
Having experienced defaulting on repayments of loans by low income earners, in the 
‘past’, financial institutions express the need for readdressing the causes of such 
problems.  Furthermore financial institutions argue that the solution to the housing crisis 
in ‘poor’ communities may not lie in compulsory lending.  They argue that the approach 
hides other social complexities, such as shortages of infrastructure that may require 
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intervention by government and other role players.  The Bill is an important attempt to 
improve access to adequate housing for low and middle income households.  However it 
may require considering some problematic aspects outlined above in order to ensure that 
housing rights are progressively realised by facilitating poor communities’ access to 
private capital through loans (Mayekiso, 2005). 
 
 
2.7 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
 
 
The discussion presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above presented the views of different 
authors on the issue of housing and housing finance and housing finance shortages and 
three main schools of thought were deduced and these are as follows: 
• Housing is a social good and a basic need for every human being and cannot be 
left entirely to market forces to control as with other goods; given that South 
Africa has a history of apartheid inequalities and that some individuals in low 
income areas have insufficient or no access to housing funds.  Therefore property 
ownership and mortgage lending policies have to be more lenient on the low 
income sector individuals. 
• The securitisation of bonds causes a reduction on interest rates, making loan 
repayments by borrowers more affordable and effectively reduces chances of 
them defaulting in their payments.  This would also be a solution to an 
unexpected increase in interest rates or other sudden unstable economic 
conditions. 
• In a study by Fannie Mae in section 2.4 reports of a lack of trusting relationships 
between lending institutions and low income sector borrowers were made and this 
could be improved by creating better methods of communication by banks in 
terms of providing housing finance education to the low income sector. 
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The FSC and the CRB are initiatives targeted at solving housing and housing finance 
shortages in South Africa.  The findings from the literature merely identify possible 
causes of housing and housing finance shortages and possible solutions to these 
problems.  What the literature review fails to do is evaluate the anticipated benefits of the 
two initiatives in solving some of the highlighted problems concerning low income sector 
housing and housing finance which this study hopes to achieve. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
DERIVATION OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
 
As previously stated in Chapter 1 the main hypothesis of the study states that: 
The bringing together of the provisions of both, the CRB and the FSC can optimise the 
delivery of the low income financing housing requirements South Africa. The sub- 
hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
1. The FSC does not specify alternatives in the case of it failing to meet its goals. 
Prioritisation of funds amongst different ministerial sectors such as agriculture, 
housing etc has not been clearly specified, which may result in other targeted 
sectors not effectively benefiting from the charter.  Meanwhile the CRB does not 
take into consideration other forms of tenure that financial institutions should 
consider in providing financial assistance. 
2. The FSC and CRB both look well laid out in ‘black and white’, but the answer to 
success of the two lies in the implementation which to a great extent lies in the 
reconciliation of the two to account for the deficiencies of the other when 
considered independently.  This had been initially proposed for 2004, so as to 
come up with a Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties.  
3. Financial lending institutions are using lending methods traditionally aimed for 
use by the high-income earning sector on the low income earning sector.  There is 
a need to encourage the design of a range of products suitable for the low income 
sector. 
All the above three hypotheses were derived from preliminary literature review done 
during the initial stages of the study, the proposal of the research in particular. 
Conceptualisation (Rugg, 2004) of the hypotheses led to the development of the research 
strategy illustrated in Diagram 3.1.  The strategy was used to test (refer to Definition of 
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Terms, pg x for hypothesis testing) the null hypotheses and thus giving the study a 
justified conclusion. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
 
The nature of this research was such that the conclusions drawn partly depended on the 
views of representatives from the Banking Association of South Africa, Ministry of 
Housing officials and various representatives from different independent organizations; 
namely, NALEDI, SANGOCO, SACC, COSATU, SANCO (Definition of Terms, pg x).  
All these representatives formed the target population for the study.  Their views were 
then refined by the use of analysis models, multi-criteria analysis model and ‘SWOT’ 
(Section 3.8) analysis were undertaken to complete the evaluation process of the FSC and 
the CRB.  Data gathering and analysis was entirely qualitative. 
 
 
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
 
Stage 1(Diagram 3.1) involved the devising of the theoretically based objectives which 
were wholly based on preliminary theoretical studies that were carried out before the 
study was embarked on (Chapter 1).  A convenience sample comprising five Banking 
association officials and five Ministry of Housing officials was used in stage two.  Fact-
finding interviews were undertaken on the Banking Association representatives since 
they fall on the FSC implementing side while Ministry of Housing officials fall on the 
side of implementation of the CRB.  Interviews were carried out in order to be able to 
compare the findings derived from these interviews in relation to the theoretically based 
hypotheses in Stage 1.  In Stage 3 of the research theoretically based propositions were 
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amended in light of the findings from the interviews.  In Stage 4 open-ended 
questionnaires were designed using constructs generated from the multi-attribute analysis 
model (Diagram 3.2).  Findings from the questionnaire survey were compared to the 
amended in light of the findings from the interviews.   
 
The research strategy illustrated in Diagram 3.1 shows the processes followed in 
conducting the study from conception to completion.  The processes were subdivided into 
6 stages. 
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Diagram 3.1:   Research strategy adopted in the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Research Methods for Business Students (Saunders, 2003) 
 
In Stage 4 open-ended questionnaires were designed using constructs generated from the 
multi-attribute analysis model (Diagram 3.2).  Findings from the questionnaire survey 
were compared to the tested propositions from stage 3 of the research.  Where necessary 
Stage 1: Objectives of the study established & theoretically based hypotheses 
devised (Refer to Chapter 1). 
Stage 2: Fact- finding interviews undertaken with the Banking Association (FSC) 
& the Department of Housing (CRB) officials. 
Stage 3: Theoretically based hypotheses tested in light of the findings from the 
interviews (Stage 3). 
Stage 4: Open-ended questionnaire survey carried out and findings compared to 
tested hypotheses from stage 3. 
Stage 5: Where necessary further testing made to the revised hypotheses with 
respect to results from the questionnaire survey. 
Stage 6: Further alterations/ fine knitting of results from stage 5 & literature 
review by the use of ‘SWOT’ analysis & current standing of MoU done to obtain 
 42
further qualifications where made to the revised hypotheses in Stage 5.  This was done in 
light of the results obtained from the questionnaire survey.  Stage 6 of the study involved 
further alterations undertaken on results of Stage 5 and selected theory from the literature 
review in Chapter 2 to derive satisfactory explanations to the research by implementation 
of SWOT analysis (Diagram 3.2). The results from the SWOT analysis were compared to 
the anticipated results of the MOU to highlight areas that the government still needs to 
address in terms of housing and its finance for the low income sector in South African 
urban areas. 
 
 
THE SOURCE OF THE RESEARCH INFORMATION 
 
 
The secondary information used in the research was obtained from different sources.  
Literature that discussed issues related to the research problem was thoroughly reviewed 
to assist in the refinement of the research topic as well as to embrace the consequences of 
the problem which the research hoped to solve.  In addition to this the literature review 
helped in complementing related work done by other researchers.  Sources of the 
literature reviewed included, the internet, recorded speeches, previous reports and papers 
published by other researchers, conference publications, government publications, 
various textbooks and newspaper articles.  It was interesting to note that some 
information was obtained from broadcasted news on various television and radio stations, 
since the research topic is still a ‘hot and burning’ issue that is still undergoing intense 
negotiations between the private sector and the Ministry of Housing in South Africa. 
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SAMPLING METHOD 
 
 
A non-probability sampling method was used for data collection and observation.  This is 
a sampling method in which observations are not selected randomly but obtaining well 
selected observations sufficient enough to draw sound conclusions (Bower, 1973).   This 
method was chosen because the research mainly sought to find out the anticipated effects 
of the FSC and CRB policies.  It should however be noted that the FSC is still in its 
infancy stages of implementation and the CRB has not been enacted.  Therefore not many 
people have an in-depth knowledge about this topic resulting in a small population size, 
suffice to say bias tends to shift towards the main groups which are; FSC implementing 
officials stood in to support the FSC while CRB implementing officials tend to support 
contents of the CRB. 
 
The non-probability sampling method used was Judgmental or Purposive sampling 
(Saunders, 2003).  This method of sampling is used to select the best sampling units to 
include in the samples gathered according to the researcher’s discretion and based on the 
aforementioned factors justifying the small population size. 
 
2 stages of data gathering were used namely, interviews and a questionnaire survey. 
Pilot Interviews: 
o 5 officials from the Banking Association were interviewed. 
o 5 officials from the Ministry of Housing were interviewed. 
Interviews were carried out not only to find out individualistic opinions of the 
interviewees as they are involved in drawing up of the FSC and the CRB, but also to 
embrace issues not captured in the literature review that would otherwise be critically 
relevant in meeting the objectives of the study. 
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INTERVIEW SURVEY 
 
 
Preliminary interviews were conducted in order to obtain views with regards to the 
current developments in implementation of the FSC and the set requirements of the CRB 
as perceived by the private sector (Banking Council officials) and the government 
(Ministry of Housing officials). 
 
Participants were asked to comment on critical issues to be considered in providing a 
solution to the issue of housing and housing finance for the low income sector in South 
Africa.  Their views were based on the FSC and CRB set objectives.  Interview questions 
were carefully formulated after review of the literature and key issues of the study had 
been outlined (refer to Appendix 2 for Interview questions). 
 
All preliminary interviews were personally conducted with the participants to ensure full 
participation, since the target population was very small and was justified by the research 
method.  All respondents held senior positions in the Banking Council and in the 
Ministry of Housing as required by the study. 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE COMPILATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
The questionnaire was structured into two sections; the first being the demographic 
profiles of the respondents while the other section contained the main questions for the 
collection of qualitative data.  The latter was divided into 8 main questions.  As the multi-
criteria evaluation model was used, the questions were all derived from this model (refer 
to Appendix 3 for questionnaire derived from Diagram 3.2 below).The multi-criteria 
model was adopted in this study as it is normally used for evaluation purposes for various 
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projects or business ventures in developing areas, that usually involve low income or 
poverty stricken individuals that require both private sector and government involvement.  
The projects usually require close monitoring and frequent assessment as various 
stakeholders would be involved.  Similarly in this study private sector, the government 
and low incomes sector individuals are some of the parties involved or affected by the 
implementation of the FSC and the CRB.   
 
Diagram 3.2:  Multi-criteria evaluation Model 
 
 
Source: Local Government (IPD, 2004) 
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested for clarity and suggestions for adjustments and was then 
modified.  This was one with two representatives from FSCC (Definition of Terms, pg x).  
EFFICIENCY 
FSC/CRB results versus 
financial targets 
ALTERNATIVE 
STRATEGIES 
Other possible ways of 
addressing the problem 
VALIDITY OF 
DESIGN 
Logical & coherent 
CAUSALITY 
Factors affecting 
FSC/CRB performance 
UNANTICIPATED 
EFFECTS 
Significant effects of 
FSC/CRB performance 
SUSTAINABILITY 
FSC/CRB benefits 
sustained after 
withdrawal of external 
support 
RELEVANCE 
FSC/CRB continues to 
make sense in meeting 
needs of communities 
EFFECTVENESS 
Achievement of 
objective reaching the 
target groups 
 
EVALUATION IS 
CONCERNED 
WITH EFFECTS & 
IMPACTS 
FOCUSING ON 
 46
It was found that the questionnaire could be successfully completed in 20 minutes.  For 
effective responses, personal, one-on-one sessions were held with the respondents to 
ensure the full participation of the respondents, due to the small sample size and for 
elimination of delays in respondents which would have had implications on the set time 
limits. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSES 
 
 
Data analyses were entirely qualitative.  At each level of data analysis, data was reduced, 
displayed and conclusions were then drawn and verified from the displayed results.   
Data reduction: This involves making summaries and selection of critical information 
that is required in meeting the study’s objectives, as well as being comparable with the 
set hypotheses.  The aim of this process was to transform and condense data to make it 
workable. 
Data display:  This involves organizing and assembling the reduced or selected data into 
diagrammatic or visual displays. Visual displays and diagrams can be developed to fit 
data specifically and assist in developing analytical thinking.  Data displays help in 
recognizing relationships and patterns in data that may be evident. 
Conclusion drawing and verification:  These are done through deductive reasoning and 
also in relation to the goals set to be obtained by the study (Saunders, 2003). 
 
SWOT analysis was adopted in stage 6 (Diagram 3.1) and is a simple method of analysis 
normally used in management of an organisation or business, used for the selection of a 
strategy or strategy for the business to follow for its success in meeting its goals or set 
objectives.  SWOT analysis is merely an assessment of an organization’s, ‘S’trengths, 
‘W’eaknesses, ‘O’pportunities and ‘T’hreats in meeting its set objectives (Smit, 1992).  
The terms are as defined below: 
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• An ‘opportunity’ is a favourable or unexploited situation.  It is usually a positive 
condition within which the project would be carried out. 
• A ‘threat’ is an unfavourable situation. It is usually a set negative condition within 
the environment within which the project would be carried out. 
• ‘Strength’ is a specific skill or other advantage that a project or business has 
which can be used to exploit an opportunity or to reduce or overcome a threat. 
• A ‘weakness’ is the lack of a specific skill at the business, project or another 
disadvantage.  A project team always tries to improve upon or eliminate 
weaknesses as these may result in a project failing to realise its objectives or fail 
completely. 
 
SWOT analysis is a technique normally used to facilitate environmental scanning, 
especially regarding the impact of the external environment on a business or project.  In 
the context of this study (Diagram 3.1); by comparing the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats of the FSC and those of the CRB, a logical framework for a 
systematic analysis of all proposals of the FSC and the CRB was obtained.  SWOT 
analysis was adopted because of its simplicity and versatility yet it clearly brought out a 
conclusive basis for evaluation of the anticipated benefits of the FSC and the CRB 
required in meeting the objectives of the study (Kroon, 1995). 
 
 
 SHORTCOMINGS AND SOURCES OF ERROR 
 
 
There was a limitation on the obtainable number of respondents for the questionnaire 
survey. Not many participants were well-versed on the topic, but the multi-criteria model 
is simple in application and so enabled basis for critical analysis of results and their 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
 
 
This chapter presents the results obtained in this study , by a step by step implementation 
of the research method developed in Chapter 3 (refer to Diagram 3.1).  At every stage 
data was presented, discussed and analysed.  The summary of the findings obtained is 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 STAGE 1: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the study as stated in Chapter 1 is to investigate the anticipated 
implications on housing of the government’s Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB and 
the financial sector’s Financial Sector Charter, FSC as well as identification of possible 
ways of improvement of housing and its associated financing, for the low income sector 
in South African urban areas. 
 
The sub-objectives of the study are: 
1. Critically analyse the housing finance provisions of Community Reinvestment 
Bill, CRB and those of the Financial Sector Charter, FSC. 
2. Compare whether or not the voluntary transforming initiatives taken by the 
Financial Sector and its institutions will bring about more or less benefits for 
individuals and communities than the CRB would guarantee. 
3. Suggest guidelines that the government or the private sector may introduce to 
ensure equitable success to housing infrastructure provision and related finance. 
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4.3 STAGE 2: INTERVIEW RESULTS 
 
 
The interview results comprised of two sets of views, those of the Banking Council 
officials (private sector) and those of the Ministry of Housing officials (government) and 
these were discussed in relation to the objectives of the study. 
 
VIEWS OF MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND BANKING COUNCIL OFFICIALS 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
Respondents’ involvement in the housing field ranged from about 1½ years to 4 years 
and those from the Banking Council (private sector) ranged from 3 years to 20 years of 
involvement in the banking field.  Highest formal qualifications of the respondents 
ranged from professional qualifications to university degrees and all respondents held 
senior positions in the government’s Department of Housing. Therefore the responses to 
the interview questions were reliable and so ensured high credibility of results obtained 
from the study. 
 
MAIN QUESTIONS  
 
Objective 1: Views on Critical Analysis of the FSC and CRB Provisions 
Firstly the government officials expressed that, if government itself had not initiated the 
introduction of the CRB then the private sector would not have made a move towards 
committing themselves towards problems related to low income housing.  Sections 8.3.2 
and 9.1.3.3 precisely relate to this study.  These sections make mention of risk handling 
issues concerned with serving the low income housing market, but do not specify risk 
sharing responsibilities between the government and the private sector. Two types of risk 
have to be handled: 
• Financial risk: this risk is also referred to as commercial risk or loss limit risk.  
This type of risk is associated with the borrower defaulting on loan repayments 
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due to different reasons, e.g. retrenchment, as in the Protea Glen evictions 
discussed under Objective 3.  The FSC proposed that they would take 
responsibility of this form of risk with the assistance of the government i.e. they 
share the risk.   
• Hedging risk:  this is the risk associated with infrastructure deficiencies resulting 
in the private sector being unable to fund the low income sector and the same risk 
causing a lack of property values appreciation in these areas, causing a 
dysfunctional property market in these areas. 
 
Effectively the private sector proposes that the government becomes liable for the 65% of 
the total risk in the provision of financing to the low income sector while the private 
sector take up the remaining 35% to all the risks involved in financing the low income 
housing sector.  Banking Council officials do not view Sections 8.3.2 and 9.1.3.3 of the 
FSC as pre-conditions but rather as targets that they hope to achieve with or without 
government assistance, although they do admit that government involvement and 
mitigation would improve on targeted results as discussed under objective 2. 
 
Meanwhile, Section 4 of the CRB gives financial institutions a clear indication on the 
manner in which lending to the low income sector has to be carried out, placing special 
emphasis on elimination of discriminating tendencies of the lending institutions.  Banking 
Council officials expressed that if the government was to impose the CRB legislation, 
then they would be forced to act involuntary and this would jeopardize the banking 
system as a whole which may also affect the medium to high income sector.  They were 
of the view that the whole property market should operate freely without government 
intervention as this would affect the natural cycles of this market.  In addition to this, they 
expressed that finance problems are not the only issue being faced by the low income 
sector but a better functioning secondary market would be more ideal as a solution to the 
housing shortage problem in these areas.  They perceive the CRB as a direct method of 
trying to solve a South African low income housing problem with an American solution, 
since it was adopted from the USA and therefore they are of the view that it would need 
to be altered to suit the South African situation. 
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Objective 2:  Comparison of Voluntary Transforming Initiatives of the FSC and 
CRB 
The private sector had initially proposed R42billion investment towards low income 
housing and had further reassured the government that they would increase this to 
R52billion if the government was to accept the 65% to 35% risk allocation defined 
above. 
 
While on the other hand the government officials were of the view that the private sector 
wanted to share with the government in handling of risk and even have the government 
carrying more of the costs associated with them handling the risk, while they made no 
mention of sharing of the profits harvested from this investment.  As goes for any 
business venture profits or returns are the rewards for taking the risk of embarking on a 
particular business venture.  The Ministry of Housing officials does agree though, that the 
R42billion that has been aimed at by the private sector for investment towards low 
income housing would have an enormous impact on the housing problem in this sector.  
After doing a simple mathematical calculation; if R100 000 was given to every household 
in this sector this would translate to four hundred and twenty thousand  households that 
would have homes.  The government officials express the fact that this would certainly 
take away the pressure from the government, if this proposal indeed came to pass. 
 
It is also interesting to note that different banks have throughout 2005 come up with 
different products in terms of encouragement of a saving culture amongst the low income 
individuals, as this was established as one of the problems, associated with the low 
income sector.  Banks operate in a competitive market and would not disclose 
information on their products but through media advertisements it is evident how banks 
have taken a step towards meeting the goals of the FSC.  This was one of the voluntary 
initiatives by the Banking Council applicable to this study. 
 
The government since 1994 has expended approximately R38billion towards low income 
housing in terms of the RDP houses built nationwide.  The Banking Council questions 
the value of these houses to the people and the appreciation potential of the values of 
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these houses.  They place doubts on the effectiveness of these houses in terms of them 
being ‘resaleable’ and them being of the required value to the owners and the occupants.  
The government proposes to spend R5.6billion towards low income sector housing in 
2006.  Besides the amounts spent a further initiative was the proposal of introduction of 
the CRB to ensure both private and public sector involvement in the struggle towards 
housing the disadvantaged and eradicating apartheid socio-economic wounds.  Already 
various initiatives through different organizations discussed in Chapter 2 of the study 
were all government initiatives towards dealing with the housing situation in the low 
income sector. 
 
Objective 3: Suggestions on Guidelines to be used by the Government and Private 
Sector to Ensure Equitable Success 
Firstly the government pointed out that if the commitments laid out by the Banking 
Council in the FSC were fulfilled, then success in terms of solving the problems of the 
low income housing and its finance would be ensured.  They strongly emphasised on the 
need for banks to change their lending culture towards the low income sector individuals 
as was supported by the Fannie Mae report discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. 
 
Deriving an understanding of this market was suggested as one of the methods of dealing 
with this problem.  Some government officials suggested that the banks rather than 
directing funds towards research on the low income housing market by foreign 
researchers such as USA’s Fannie Mae, these funds could instead be used by the 
government who would act as an intermediary between the private sector and the low 
income sector.  With regards to loan granting assessment to individuals, banks determine 
this by the use of the Credit Bureau records.  This is whereby an individual who is 
blacklisted by the Credit Bureau is automatically disqualified from obtaining a home 
loan, for an amount as low as R50.  The government officials perceive this as 
inappropriate means for determining one’s fate of being granted a home loan and this 
method does not wholly depict an individual’s loan repayment capacity.  They suggest 
that banks use different criteria for determining one’s ability to acquire finance for 
housing.  This follows the incident of the Protea Glen Evictions whereby: 
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“In July of 2004, evictions in Protea Glen, a middle-income privately developed suburb 
in Soweto, Gauteng raised several separate but related issues.  Working under instruction 
from the banks, the sheriff issued eviction orders to residents who had defaulted on their 
bond repayments.  Residents resisted eviction and eventually the Minister of Housing, 
Lindiwe Sisulu intervened.  The story that wasn’t explored in detail was how this 
situation arose.  The Housing Minister acknowledged that the banks were operating 
entirely within their legal rights” (Rust, 2004).  Government officials perceive the banks 
as being insensitive to the needs of the low income sector by at least trying to have 
individual monitoring of lenders rather than dismissing them off as a group of defaulting 
clients.  Some of the people are reported to have paid up to 4 months advance 
repayments, but still faced eviction. 
 
It was also brought out that low income earners are expected to have higher interest rates 
of approximately 16%, due to them being riskier clients, while normally interests are 
charged at approximately 10%.  Some government officials suggested that banks work in 
stages of reduced interest rates.  This is achieved through dropping it from 16% down to 
say 13% and down to 10% throughout the loan repayment period, as clients prove their 
loyalty to loan repayment commitments, rather than having a fixed and extremely high 
16%.  This high interest rate may rule out the low income sector from acquiring loans.  
Banks may achieve this by creation of different financing options ‘tailor-made’ for the 
low income sector (Rust, 2005). 
 
On the other hand the Banking Council officials completely deny the issue of low income 
sector individuals being mistreated when it comes to them approaching banks for home 
loans.  They went on to explain that perceptions of low income individuals not being 
offered the same service as other home loan seekers is what still remains and they 
mention how banks have changed their approach.  Suggestions made by these officials 
are that partnerships with mind set changes of seeing banks as mistreating low income 
individuals should be formed.  In this way different stakeholders are involved and 
through reaching consensus with regards to different issues, equitable success would be 
ensured in the provision of housing and its finance for the low income sector.  In addition 
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to this the Banking Council officials claim of lots of intellectual capacity sitting on their 
Board, that still needs to be unleashed, but the climate not conducive because of the 
government setting conditions on them.  The interviewed Banking Council officials did 
not go into detail, as to which limitations the government was placing on them, that 
impeded on the potential to provide better solutions to the low income sector. 
 
The Banking Council officials also strongly pointed out that the solution to housing for 
the low income sector not only lying in its financing but that the break through to the 
problem is through having a functional secondary market in the low income areas.  Again 
with regards to the Protea Glen Evictions the following was discussed: 
“In a normal market when homeowners fall on hard times and are unable to meet their 
mortgage obligations, they sell their homes and use the equity from the sale to buy 
cheaper and more affordable housing.  In this way home ownership is understood world-
wide to be a kind of safety net against bad times.  Yet in South Africa’s townships, 
however, this isn’t the case.  In these areas the secondary market is dysfunctional.  The 
Protea Glen residents could neither find a buyer for their homes nor could they find 
cheaper homes as an alternative.  They were locked into their homes with no where to go.  
Due to their inability to sell their homes the equity the Protea Glen residents invested in 
them was worthless.  When the banks repossessed their homes, they lost the houses they 
had long been investing in.  Some of these residents were reported to have been close to 
completing their bond repayments, but lost their residential properties regardless of this 
condition.  Therefore an effective secondary market would reduce both the level of 
default as well as the levels of loss on default.  This is because the ability to sell 
properties quickly at a near market related price would enable households who can no 
longer meet their mortgage repayments to sell and downsize themselves without legal 
intervention.  If the situation degenerates to the point of repossession, the properties still 
can be sold at market related values in a shorter period” (Rust, 2004). 
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4.4 STAGE 3: TESTING OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 
The hypotheses from stage 1 which were based on preliminary literature review, were 
tested based on the findings from the interview survey and the following hypotheses were 
results were obtained: 
1. Sections 8.3.2 and 9.1.3.3 of the FSC precisely and directly relate to this study.  
Due to the Ministry of Housing and the private sector not having reached 
consensus concerning the issue of risk sharing responsibilities, this currently 
forms the most critical aspect of the FSC.  The rest of the FSC seems convincing 
to the government officials, but the abovementioned sections still need to be 
ironed out. 
 The CRB exerts pressure on the private sector to act involuntarily and imposing 
the CRB legislation on the private sector, would jeopardize the natural 
functioning of the property market as a whole in South Africa given that, the 
upper end of the country’s property market, based on world-wide standards is 
really performing well.  The CRB does not take cognisance of other factors 
affecting the low income sector property market such as the functionality of its 
secondary market.  It only focuses on the financing aspect, related banking 
practices and how these should be monitored. 
2. Until the government had proposed the introduction of the CRB, the private sector 
had not presented any initiatives in as far as contribution towards assisting the low 
income sector with housing or its financing was concerned.  While on the other 
hand they have guaranteed to form as much as the government has performed 
through provision of R42billion towards home loans.  The government in the last 
11 years has spent close to R38billion on housing in the low income sector.  Yet 
so much more can be achieved with both the private sector and the government 
working jointly.  This would be achieved through the settling of the on-going 
negotiations of the Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties. 
3. Equitable success may be achieved by the following suggestions: 
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• If the private sector fulfills the commitments laid down in the FSC. 
• Culture adjustments by the banks have to be made together with the specific 
understanding of the workings of the low income sector market. 
• Leniency on the individuals given their apartheid disadvantageous background by 
the banks is encouraged.  This can be done by adjustment of the criteria used for 
granting loans to the low income individuals and use of varying interests rates as 
opposed to fixed, extremely high interests rates. 
• Formation of partnerships in dealing with low income housing problems between 
different stakeholders is encouraged. 
• Accommodation of new intellectual ideas should be promoted to adjust set 
perceptions which may hinder progress. 
• Establishment of an effective secondary market in the low income areas through 
infrastructure upgrading, etc and other factors would resolve issues associated 
with defaulting on loan repayments of the low income sector individuals. 
 
 
4.5 STAGE 4: QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS  
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
Representatives from five chosen independent organizations all had at least five or more 
years in their organizations.  Their highest formal qualifications were all professional 
qualifications, such as journalism, public relations, etc.  The organizations do not only 
deal with matters related to housing, but the representatives that volunteered to take part 
in the questionnaire survey were those that have had a follow up on the on-going 
meetings between the government and the private sector with regards to the issue of 
housing and its finance for the low income sector in South Africa.  Therefore their 
contribution in terms of the evaluation of the FSC and the CRB was considered to be 
valid. 
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MAIN QUESTIONS  
 
This stage of the research was mainly done for the purpose of evaluating the Financial 
Sector Charter, FSC and the Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB. The use of the multi-
criteria evaluation model was made in formulation of the questions for the questionnaire 
as well as analysis of the responses to these questionnaires.  This model was employed 
because of its relevancy to the study and the fact that evaluation can be determined at any 
stage of a project, be it planning, implementation or after a project has been carried out. It 
is therefore applicable to the evaluation of the CRB as it has undergone planning and has 
not been implemented.  It is also applicable to the FSC which is undergoing 
implementation.  Results from the survey are presented in the tables below. Table 4.1 
presents results on evaluation of the CRB, while Table 4.2 presents the results on the 
evaluation of the FSC.  These were obtained from the questionnaire responses.  Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 are to be used in conjunction with Diagram 3.2 to derive an understanding of 
how the model was implemented.  For each factor of evaluation, a (yes/no) response was 
to be given to assess whether the CRB or FSC had an impact concerning that particular 
factor.  The effect of the impact was then specified (refer to Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
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Table 4.1:  CRB Questionnaire Survey Results (Refer to Diagram 3.2) 
EVALUATION OF THE CRB(QUESTIONNAIRE    RESULTS) 
  FACTOR OF EVALUATION 
IMPACT 
(YES/NO) EFFECT 
1 EFFECTIVENESS YES 
→compelled private sector to introduce the FSC which in turn caused 
the private sector to make a contribution towards the problem of 
housing and its finance in the low income sector. 
      
→to have the private sector meeting all the objective of the CRB might 
involve forcing its members to act involuntarily, which is why they are 
adamant to make the FSC successful. 
        
2 EFFICIENCY YES 
→monitoring of lending practices of lending institutions would ensure 
elimination of discrimination; therefore more individuals would stand 
better chances of obtaining housing loans. 
        
3 RELEVANCE YES 
→an increase in the stock of properties in the low income sector would 
reduce housing shortages. 
        
4 SUSTAINABILITY YES 
→ensures that defaulters' reasons for failing to keep up with loan 
repayments are investigated before eviction from their properties is 
carried out. 
        
5 
ANTICIPATED 
EFFECTS YES 
→involvement of the private sector, whether positive or negative, is 
ensured. 
        
6 CAUSALITY YES 
→failure of the private sector to fulfill its commitments of the FSC may 
result in them having to comply with the terms set out in the CRB. 
        
7 
VALIDITY OF THE 
DESIGN YES 
→it is logical & applicable to the low income housing sector as it takes 
away all ailments of discrimination of individuals to accessing from 
lending institutions & promotes fair lending practices. 
        
8 
ATERNATIVE 
STRATEGIES YES 
→penalties are given to institutions that fail to comply with set out 
terms in the CRB, but the CRB does not specify any course of action if 
its implementation is not successful.   
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Table 4.2:  FSC Questionnaire Survey Results (Refer to Diagram 3.2) 
EVALUATION OF THE FSC(QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS) 
  
FACTOR OF 
EVALUATION 
IMPACT 
(YES/NO) EFFECT 
1 EFFECTIVENESS YES 
→with the progress made thus far, most respondents were 
convinced that the FSC will indeed meet its set objectives, 
including the R42billion target in terms of home loans 
provision. 
        
2 EFFICIENCY NO 
→R42billion is targeted for spending for low income housing 
between 2004 and 2014, with a review period in 200othing 8. 
Between 1January 2004 & 1January 2005 nothing had been 
spent due to some delay in staff appointment, hence to this 
date, the FSC has not been efficient.  
        
3 RELEVANCE YES 
→there will be an increase in housing stock in the low income 
areas & a 'saving culture' amongst the individuals in these 
areas is encouraged. 
        
4 SUSTAINABILITY NO 
→when the low income sector individuals default on loan 
repayments, no grounds for explaining their circumstances are 
given before eviction takes place. 
        
5 
ANTICIPATED 
EFFECTS YES 
→Low income sector individuals getting an insight on the 
workings of loans and related loan education is ensured. 
        
6 CAUSALITY NO →none have been identified as yet. 
        
7 
VALIDITY OF 
THE DESIGN YES 
→logical & applicable to the low income sector although 
respondents expressed sentiments of lending institutions not 
having in-depth understanding of this specific market. 
        
8 
ATERNATIVE 
STRATEGIES NO 
→in the case of the FSC failing to meet its objectives, it does 
not present any recourse or alternative strategy for meeting 
the housing and housing finance needs of the low income 
sector.   
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ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
The CRB satisfies all the 8 factors of evaluation in the multi-criteria evaluation model 
(refer to Diagram 3.2).  Therefore it is bound to be a success although when factor 8 is 
critically analysed it is evident that no mention is made of alternative strategies in case 
the CRB was to fail in its implementation. 
 
On the other hand, the FSC does not satisfy four out of eight of the evaluation factors in 
the model.  The FSC is not efficient at this moment in time, because of failure to realize 
any meeting of financial targets currently.  Of the targeted R42billion, after one year, 
none has been spent as yet.  The FSC does not satisfy sustainability as it does not take 
into consideration any assistance to be provided to defaulting individuals and if its 
financial assistance is withdrawn, individuals would financially ‘collapse’ as in the case 
of the Protea Glen evictions and taking note of the fact that the financial institutions have 
not made any adjustment to such cases.  Causality does not actually amount to a negative 
impact, as the performance of the FSC is not dependant upon performance of the CRB.  It 
works independently which is neither a positive nor negative aspect.  Again the FSC does 
not provide any strategies that it would adopt in the case of its implementation failing.  In 
terms of financial institutions failing to follow the obligations set out in the FSC no 
penalties are charged.  Well-performing institutions are rather awarded points on the 
scorecard, which sets out minimum targets that should have been fulfilled by 2014.  The 
points awarded are basically for securing long term, financially secure and stable 
contracts with the government.    
 
Based on the overall anticipated impact of the CRB and FSC in tables 4.1 and 4.2, it may 
seem as though the CRB stands a better chance of success than the FSC, but what has to 
be noted is that the multi criteria model employed may be used for evaluation purposes at 
any given point in time.  The CRB is being evaluated in its planning phase because its 
implementation has not yet commenced, while the FSC is being evaluated in its 
implementation phase.  This is a possible reason for it having more negative aspects than 
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the CRB.  If they were both being evaluated in the same phase, then the results would be 
more comparable and more accurate. 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS 
 
Most respondents expressed opinions of the government being rather too lenient on the 
private sector in terms of providing contributions that could assist the low income sector 
in terms of housing and some strongly felt that the CRB should have been legislated 
without giving the private sector a chance with the FSC.  With regards to the Protea Glen 
evictions, most respondents felt that the evicted individuals were not given a fair chance 
to have their cases investigated for appropriate handling.  An example was given of how 
a household with 11 occupants and only one being the ‘bread winner’ who happened to 
be a mine worker.  He got retrenched, leaving him and his 10 dependants homeless after 
the evictions.  According to some respondents these kinds of cases compel low income 
sector individuals to resort to ‘loan sharks’ who charge them abnormally high interests 
rates, ranging from 100% to 300%.  With such situations respondents suggested both 
government and private sector to be more lenient on these individuals as well as 
providing them with safer and less harsh financial lending institutions.  Some respondents 
commented on how after 1994, the economic growth of South Africa rose by 
approximately 4% and how financial institutions gained from this growth.  Yet the 
financial sector chose to reinvest into the upper end of the property market were business 
appeared to be more lucrative, while the low income sector was left to struggle on its 
own.  
 
 
4.6 STAGE 5: QUALIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 
The hypotheses from stage 3 which were based on the preliminary literature study, 
review and open-ended interview questions, were further tested according to the findings 
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from the questionnaire survey, which involved use of the multi criteria evaluation model.  
The following amended hypotheses were obtained:  
1. Sections 8.3.2 and 9.1.3.3 of the FSC precisely and directly relate to this study.  
Due to the Ministry of Housing and the private sector not having reached 
consensus concerning the issue of risk sharing responsibilities, this currently 
forms the most critical aspect of the FSC.  The rest of the FSC seems convincing 
to the government officials, but the abovementioned sections still need to be 
ironed out.  Most of the respondents from the independent organizations were of 
the view that the CRB suspension was an act of leniency on the private sector, 
following the Protea Glen evictions. 
 The CRB exerts pressure on the private sector to act involuntarily and imposing 
the CRB legislation on the private sector, would jeopardize the natural 
functioning of the property market as a whole in South Africa given that, the 
upper end of the country’s property market based on world-wide standards is 
really performing well.  The CRB does not take cognisance of other factors 
affecting the low income sector property market such as the functionality of its 
secondary market.  It only focuses on the financing aspect, related banking 
practices and how these should be monitored. 
2. Until the government had proposed the introduction of the CRB, the private sector 
had not presented any initiatives in as far as contribution towards assisting the low 
income sector with housing or its financing was concerned.  While on the other 
hand they have guaranteed to perform as much as the government has performed 
through provision of R42billion towards home loans.  This R42billion was 
targeted for spending from the period beginning 2004, but nothing has been spent 
thus far i.e. December 2005.  The government in the last 11 years has spent close 
to R38billion on housing in the low income sector.  Yet so much more can be 
achieved with both the private sector and the government working jointly.  This 
would be achieved through the settling of the on-going negotiations of the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties. 
3. Equitable success may be achieved by the following suggestions: 
• If the private sector fulfills the commitments laid down in the FSC. 
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• Culture adjustments by the banks have to be made together with the specific 
understanding of the workings of the low income sector market. 
• Leniency on the individuals given their apartheid disadvantaged background by 
the banks is encouraged.  This can be done by adjustment of the criteria used to 
for granting loans to the low income individuals and use of varying interests rates 
as opposed to fixed, extremely high interests rates. 
• Formation of partnerships in dealing with low income housing problems between 
different stakeholders is encouraged. 
• Accommodation of new intellectual ideas should be promoted to adjust set 
perceptions which may hinder progress. 
• Establishment of an effective secondary market in the low income areas through 
infrastructure upgrading and other factors would resolve issues associated with 
defaulting on loan repayments of the low income sector individuals. 
It should be noted that the underlined factors were the additions derived from stage 4, 
while all other findings were consistent with stage 2 findings. 
 
 
4.7 STAGE 6: FURTHER QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 
SWOT ANALYSIS  
 
Up to this point only views of the Banking Council officials, Ministry of Housing 
officials and a selected few representatives from different independent organizations have 
been used in the analyses of data obtained.  At this stage, SWOT analysis (refer to 
Section 3.8) included the use of selected information from the literature review in 
Chapter 2. The following results were obtained: 
The CRB and the FSC are to be implemented in a market with the following social 
climate: 
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OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Both private and public sector involvement as a foundation that currently exists 
have teamed up to find a solution to housing and housing finance for the low 
income sector.  This is the cornerstone approach to dealing with this problem. 
 
THREATS 
1. Since 1994 there has been a sharp increase in rural to urban migrations.  This has 
been accompanied by splits in the ‘extended family’ set up, due to groups of split 
families desiring to live independently. To add on to this there is limited housing 
delivery in low income areas.  All these factors amount to housing shortages in 
the low income sector property market.  This leads to an increase in the quantity 
of houses and amount of finance for housing demanded in these areas especially 
houses costing between R60 000 and R100 000. 
2. Due to a history of apartheid, low income areas (usually townships) are 
characterised by poor social amenities provision which include poor social 
infrastructure, and poor service delivery and limited housing delivery.  This was 
as a result of these areas being regarded as temporary areas of residence. 
3. The number of existing households, 10.5million, outnumbers the number of the 
formally employed, 10million.  This gap suggests a considerable number of 
individuals in informal employment who possibly require being educated 
regarding financing for housing.  In addition to this some low income individuals 
are not well educated and this being accounted for by various disadvantages and 
so require consumer education on housing finance options. 
4. Recently there has been an increase in problems related to access finance for 
developers coupled with a subsidy erosion due to inflation have caused a 
reduction in the supply of housing in the low income sector housing market. 
5. Housing shortages in the secondary market exist due to stagnant primary markets. 
Since the supply of houses has reduced there is an interrupted flow of the buying 
and selling of housing stock on the secondary market. 
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6. The lack of a trusting relationship between low income housing loan services and 
low income borrowers prevents South African services from implementing best 
practices in low income housing loan arrears management. 
7. A large pool of funds circulates outside the formal financial system, including 
unlimited funds held by ‘stokvels’, informal traders and other forms of short term 
saving. 
 
STRENGTHS 
The FSC is characterised by the following positive features: 
1. It specifically focuses on financing investment in: 
a. Transformational infrastructure projects that support economic development in 
underdeveloped areas and contribute towards equitable access to economic 
resources through BEE. 
b. Low income housing finance for households with a minimum income of R 500 
per month and for households with a stable income in the excess of R1 500 per 
month and less than R7 000 per month. 
2. Housing involves creating functional, self contained and sustainable communities.  
According to the FSC, each financial institution has to direct 0.5 of its annual 
after tax profits towards CSI. 
The CRB is characterized by the following positive features: 
1. It is aimed at expanding access to housing finance, thereby boosting housing 
opportunities for low and medium income sector households. 
2. It compels financial lending institutions to engage in the provision of home loans, 
to make finance available to the lower end of the home loan market.  This was 
done in such a way that banks set aside a portion of their funding to meet the 
needs of the low income households in accessing home loan finance and thus 
private sector involvement is ensured. 
 
WEAKNESSES 
The FSC has the following negative features: 
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1. Most financial institutions lack models that predict borrower default in that 
borrowers are contacted late in the default management process. 
2. The FSC does not provide any alternative strategies in case the intended plans of 
operation are not successful in implementation. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
By application of SWOT analysis to a project, or in this case the CRB and FSC seek to 
exploit their opportunities and strengths.  Threats and weaknesses are to be countered in 
order to reduce their influence or if possible eliminate them completely to achieve 
success in the implementation of the FSC and CRB.  If possible the opportunities and 
strengths are exploited in such that they override some of the threats and weaknesses as 
in the case of the results displayed above. 
 
Teaming up of the private and public sectors would result in the maximum possible 
provision of low income sector housing which would significantly reduce the housing 
shortages in these areas.  It is also the FSC and CRB’s common objective to extend 
housing finance resources into low income areas through increasing its access to more 
people in these areas.  In so doing borrowers are discouraged from sourcing funds from 
informal traders.  The FSC’s transformational infrastructure projects and the CSI funds 
are essential for improvement of social amenities and education provision regarding loan 
facilities in the low income areas.  Monitoring of banking practices of financial 
institutions of the CRB ensures that trusting relationships are developed between the 
financial lending institutions and the low income sector individuals.  Therefore threats 4 
and 5 and weaknesses 1 and 2 remain unresolved. 
 
OBJECTIVES SET OUT BY THE MOU BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF 
HOUSING AND THE BANKING ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The Minister of Housing, The Banking Association, and the CEOs of the banks ABSA, 
FNB (Appendix, 1), NEDCOR and Standard Bank, signed a MoU on 31 March 2005 to 
establish a partnership to with the following objectives: 
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1. To facilitate the creation of properly functioning housing markets in previously 
under-served areas and to make home loan finance available and accessible to 
those previously denied access. 
2. To facilitate the implementation of the housing and other relevant sections of the 
Financial Sector Charter (FSC) that enhances and contributes to the development 
of sustainable human settlements. 
In implementation of these objectives the following mandated areas were assigned teams 
from the government and the Banking Council, with a Joint Negotiating team to offer 
guidance to: 
i. CONSUMER/ BORROWER EDUCATION 
 Both parties have an obligation for education.  The government was to be 
responsible for Consumer Education, while the banks were to be responsible for 
Borrower Education.  The consumer and borrower education curriculum would be 
developed jointly, while implementation would be coordinated, the actual 
implementation, would be done by each party individually.  Each party would be 
responsible for their respective costs.  The set of products being developed by the 
banks would be targeted mainly at the housing FSC target market. 
ii. INDIVIDUAL FINANCE LINKED SUBSIDY(DEPOSIT SUPPORT) 
 Both parties agreed that the subsidy would attach to the individual and not to the 
property.  Subsidy amounts in the R1 500 to R3 500 level would remain 
unchanged from the current policy, and that the joint working team would 
investigate further models to achieve a smooth ladder and equitable distribution of 
subsidy benefit up to and including a R7 000 monthly household incomes. 
iii. IMMEDIATE IMPEDEMENTS(LEGISLATIVE) 
 Both parties agreed that the approach to be adopted by the joint working team 
would be in the context of the constitution, legislation, parliamentary processes, 
and South Africa’s history.  Consideration should be given to the needs of this 
target market to achieve normalisation.  The department of Housing would 
through its channels, facilitate the raising of issues that the banks have with 
respect to the National Credit Bill and which the department of Housing agreed to 
have relevance to housing delivery which had not been raised before by either 
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party.  Both parties also confirmed the need for a Home Loan Code of Practice in 
the target market with appropriate sanctions and participation by the Banking 
Ombudsman.  The parties further agreed that the handling of the rates and taxes 
by municipalities was an essential issue that needed to be addressed. The joint 
team would engage with necessary organizations on how to address this matter 
especially with regards to consistent interpretation of current regulations, and 
upholding of the rule of law.  The parties also stressed that BEE should be 
addressed under the Terms of Reference, and would be addressed across various 
teams, with every team having BEE as a criterion. 
iv. PRODUCT INNOVATION AND RELATED FUNDING(DIFFERENT 
PRODUCTS BY BANKS) 
 The government noted that the banks, considered a fixed rate lending product, 
related funding mechanism, and a loss insurer to be critical to successfully 
addressing the FSC target market.  The government agreed that a fixed rate 
product needs a hedging mechanism. 
v. RISK UNDERPIN (COLLATERAL DEFFECIENCY/LOSS LIMIT 
INSURANCE) 
 The government further acknowledged that it did have a role to play in risk 
underpinning.  As part of the mutually agreed process, the government would 
explore the various options including market and non-market possibilities and 
would revert with a response on how to take this matter further after fully 
completing internal processes.  Further, it was agreed that the government team 
would explore different options towards presenting a firm proposal.  Thereafter, 
the joint working team would explore all proposals and present a report by July 
2005 to the Joint Negotiating team for negotiation and conclusion (Moue Progress 
Report, 2005).   
 
The MoU parties seemed to have reached some form of consensus regarding all its areas 
of concern, except for the one issue of loss limit risk insurance.  No conclusion was made 
in July of 2005 as had been required.  The date for the report presentation has since been 
postponed to some time in 2006.  
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It is interesting to note that the unresolved threats 4 and 5 from the SWOT analysis are 
addressed in the MoU.  The problem of subsidy erosion due to inflation in 4 is addressed 
by factor (ii) in the MoU, in that the government and the banking council agreed on 
jointly working together towards investigating on other models to resolve this problem.  
Factor (v) in the MoU addresses threat 5 in the SWOT analysis in that all the immediate 
impediments affecting delivery of housing in the low income sector market and causing 
stagnancy in the secondary housing market were legislated to achieve normalisation in 
these markets.  Yet weaknesses 1 and 2 from the SWOT analysis still remain unresolved. 
 
 
4.8 CONCLUDING INTERPRETATIONS 
 
 
Hypotheses derived in stage 5 were further adjusted based on the results of the SWOT 
analysis and the application of the MoU objectives, and the following concluding main 
results were obtained: 
1. Sections 8.3.2 and 9.1.3.3 of the FSC precisely and directly relate to this study.  
Due to the Ministry of Housing and the private sector not having reached 
consensus concerning the issue of risk sharing responsibilities, this currently 
forms the most critical aspect of the FSC.  The rest of the FSC seems convincing 
to the government officials, but the abovementioned sections still need to be 
ironed out.  Most of the respondents from the independent organisations were of 
the view that the CRB suspension was an act of leniency on the private sector, 
following the Protea Glen evictions. From application of the multi-criteria model 
and SWOT analysis to this study, the lack of alternative strategies by the FSC in 
the occurrence of failure of its implementation was identified as one of its 
weaknesses. 
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The CRB exerts pressure on the private sector to act involuntarily and imposing 
the CRB legislation on the private sector, would jeopardize the natural 
functioning of the property market as a whole in South Africa given that, the 
upper end of the country’s property market, based on world-wide standards is 
really performing well.  The CRB does not take cognisance of other factors 
affecting the low income sector property market, such as the functionality of its 
secondary market.  It only focuses on the financing aspect, related banking 
practices and how these should be monitored. 
 
2. Until the government had proposed the introduction of the CRB, the private sector 
had not presented any initiatives in as far as contribution towards assisting the low 
income sector with housing or its financing was concerned.  While on the other, 
the private sector through the FSC, has guaranteed to perform as much as the 
government has performed through provision of R42billion towards home loans.  
This R42billlion was targeted for spending for the period beginning 2004, but 
nothing has been spent thus far.  The government in the last 11 years has spent 
close to R38billion on housing in the low income sector.  Yet so much more can 
be achieved with both the private sector and the government working jointly.  
This would be achieved through the settling of the on-going negotiations of the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties. 
 
3. Equitable success may be achieved by the following suggestions: 
• If the private sector fulfills the commitments laid down in the FSC. 
• Culture adjustments by the banks have to be made together with the specific 
understanding of the workings of the low income sector market. 
• Leniency on the individuals given their apartheid disadvantaged background by 
the banks is encouraged.  This can be done by adjustment of the criteria used for 
granting loans to the low income individuals and use of varying interest rates as 
opposed to fixed, extremely high interest rates. 
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• Formation of partnerships in dealing with low income housing problems between 
different stakeholders is encouraged and the MoU is a step forward in achieving 
this. 
• Accommodation of new intellectual ideas should be promoted to adjust set 
perceptions which may hinder progress. 
• Establishment of an effective secondary market in the low income areas through 
infrastructure upgrading and other factors would resolve issues associated with 
defaulting on loan repayments of the low income sector individuals. 
• Financial lending institutions have to devise methods or identify models that 
predict borrower defaulting in that borrowers are contacted earlier in the default 
management process as identified in the SWOT analysis. 
 
 
4.9 CONCLUSIONS ON HYPOTHESES 
 
 
The research sought to test the initially stated hypotheses which are the null hypotheses 
(Definitions of Terms, pg x)).  Based on the main results in section 4.8 which are the 
alternative hypotheses to the study, it was essential to determine whether the null 
hypotheses were to be accepted or rejected based on the main results, which were the 
alternative hypotheses (Definition of Terms, pg x)).  This was done in order to meet the 
objectives of the study. 
Sub-hypothesis 1: This was partially acceptable in that the FSC does not specify 
alternatives in the case of it failing to meet its goals.  The prioritization of funds amongst 
different ministerial sectors was not a relevant issue to this study and so was rejected.  
The CRB not taking into consideration different forms of tenure was also rejected as this 
is actually accounted for in the CRB. 
Sub-hypothesis 2:  This was accepted because the voluntary transforming initiatives of 
the FSC and those of the CRB independently are outweighed by the combined efforts of 
the two parties.  Anticipated benefits from the combination are dependant on the 
finalizing of the MoU negotiations. 
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Sub-hypothesis 3:  This was accepted as financial lending institutions do need to expand 
on the range of products available to the low income sector for housing finance.  This 
alone is not the only suggested solution more results were given in the main findings of 
the study below. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
 
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The main objective of the study was to investigate the anticipated implications on low 
income housing finance of the government’s CRB and the financial sector’s FSC.  The 
main hypothesis initially proposed was that the enactment of the CRB would imply 
forcing the private sector to act unwillingly and this may further hinder the private sector 
from effectively addressing the financing of the low income sector housing in South 
Africa although implementation of the FSC would to some extent reduce housing 
shortages in the low income sector.  The results of the study showed that this is true based 
on the following findings: 
 
Views on the Critical Analysis of the FSC and the CRB Provisions 
 
After critical analysis of the FSC and the CRB it was found that: 
• The Ministry of Housing officials and the private sector have not agreed on the 
issue of risk sharing responsibilities and this is the most critical aspect of the FSC 
to be considered by both parties.  
• Sections 8.3.2 and 9.1.3.3 of the FSC precisely and directly relate to the critical 
issue of risk sharing responsibilities between the government and the private 
sector. 
• Lack of alternative strategies by the FSC in the case of its failure in 
implementation was identified as a weakness of the FSC. 
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• The CRB is seen by the private sector as exerting pressure on them to act 
involuntarily and it being imposed on them thereby jeopardising the natural 
functioning of the South African property market as a whole. 
• The private sector views the CRB as not considering other non-pecuniary factors 
affecting the low income sector property market such as the smooth functioning 
of the secondary market, which would be a solution to some of the housing 
related problems in these areas.  They were of the view that the CRB only focuses 
on the financing aspect of the housing problems, banking practices and how they 
should be monitored. 
• Independent organizations view the CRB suspension as an act of leniency by the 
government on the private sector following cases such as the Protea Glen 
evictions were residents were evicted out of their homes without being given a 
chance to justify or argue out their circumstances. 
 
Comparison of the Voluntary Transforming Initiatives of the FSC and those of the 
CRB 
The government spent approximately R38billion over the past 11 years on RDP housing 
for the low income (R1500 per month and below) sector property market while the 
private sector proposes to spend at least R42billion for the period commencing in 2004  
for housing finance in the R 500 to R7 000 a month income range.  Yet so much more 
can be achieved with their combined efforts in the following areas: 
• Consumer borrower education 
• Individual finance-linked subsidies 
• Product innovation and related funding mechanisms  
• Risk underpinning for collateral deficiency 
• Immediate legislative impediments to properly functioning housing markets  
The low income housing market would thus benefit in all these areas.  This would be 
achieved through the settling of the on-going negotiations between the two parties 
involved. 
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Suggestions on the Guidelines to be used by the Government and Private Sector to 
ensure Equitable Success. 
The suggestions on the guidelines to be implanted by the government and the private 
sector to ensue equitable success in providing solutions to housing and housing finance 
problems formed part of meeting the objectives of the study and are presented as 
recommendations in section 5.2. 
 
The study was successful in meeting all its objectives as shown in the findings presented 
above and the suggestions outlined below. Based on the findings of the study, the main 
hypothesis was proved to be correct in that the consolidation of the provisions of both, 
the CRB and the FSC can indeed optimize the delivery of the low income financing 
housing requirements in South Africa. It may therefore be deduced that since the 
financial sector was given the platform to implement the FSC, failure to do so may allow 
for the government to enact the CRB thus ensuring delivery of housing finance to the low 
income sector. In this way provisions of both the FSC and CRB are exhausted. 
 
 
5.2 POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Listed below are some possible areas of improvement derived from the study.  Equitable 
success in low income housing and its finance may be achieved by the following 
suggestions: 
• If the private sector fulfills the commitments laid down in the FSC. 
• Culture adjustments by the banks have to be made together with the specific 
understanding of the workings of the low income sector market. 
• Leniency on the individuals given their apartheid disadvantaged background by 
the banks is encouraged.  This can be done by adjustment of the criteria used for 
granting loans to the low income individuals and use of varying interests rates as 
opposed to fixed, extremely high interests rates. 
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• Formation of partnerships in dealing with low income housing problems between 
different stakeholders is encouraged and the MoU is a step forward in achieving 
this. 
• Accommodation of new intellectual ideas should be promoted to adjust set 
perceptions which may hinder progress. 
• Establishment of an effective secondary market in the low income areas through 
infrastructure upgrading, etc and other factors would resolve issues associated 
with defaulting on loan repayments of the low income sector individuals. 
• Financial lending institutions have to devise methods or identify models that 
predict borrower defaulting in that borrowers are contacted earlier in the default 
management process. 
• Provision of different forms of mortgage securities by financial lending 
institutions, intermediaries and the government. 
 
 
5.3 GAPS IN THE STUDY AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
 
The study does not discuss different models or loan options that the banks can use to 
increase the borrowing options available to low income sector individuals for housing 
finance.  An example is that of use of different forms of securities.  It also does not look 
at how other similar developing countries like Malaysia successfully dealt with the same 
problem of housing and housing finance problems for their low income sector.  Therefore 
further topics of study would be;  Different Housing Finance Options that can be used by  
South African Financial Lending Institutions  to Target the Low Income Sector and 
Formulation of Solutions for the Low Income Sector Housing and Housing Finance 
Crisis by Application of the Malaysian Success Story. 
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5.4 ENDING NOTE 
 
 
All the objectives of the study were successfully met.  The FSC and CRB were 
extensively evaluated based on opinions of Banking Council officials, Ministry of 
Housing officials, representatives from independent organizations and the multi-criteria 
mode for evaluation model and SWOT analysis were further implemented for further 
evaluation.  It can be concluded that the goals of the study were successfully met.
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APPENDIX A: SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
DOCUMENTS 
Research Topic: An Evaluation of the Financial Sector Charter and the Community 
Reinvestment Bill 
 
 
Research survey by 
 
Ms Edith Nyandoro 
Faculty of engineering and built environment, University of the Witwatersrand 
 
INTERVIEWEE’S CHOICE OF DATE AND TIME SLOTS 
 
Kindly tick any two dates and time slots among the options indicated below: 
 
PREFERED DATE:   
                    
      31/10/05 (Mon)                          02/11/05 (Wed)             04/11/05 (Fri) 
   
      01/11/05 (Tues)                          03/11/05 (Thu)    
 
  
TIME: 
 
      09:00 – 09:30                             10:00 – 10:30                             11:00 – 11:30 
 
      12:00 – 12:30                             13:00 – 13:30                             14:00 – 14:30 
              
      15:00 – 15:30                             16:00 – 15:30 
 
       Other (kindly specify)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other: _________  
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Please indicate your name: 
 
Physical contact address: 
(For interview) 
                                        
 
Kindly fax this sheet to: 011 339 8175.  Attention:  Ms Edith Nyandoro (Tel: 
0724311402) 
 
Thank you! 
 
 
 
Edith Nyandoro       Francois Viruly 
(Researcher)                                                                    (Supervisor) 
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An Evaluation of the Financial Sector Charter and the Community 
Reinvestment Bill  
 
Research survey 
 
By 
Edith Nyandoro 
Faculty of Engineering & the Built Environment, 
University of the Witwatersrand 
 
INTERVIEW WITH : 
 
SECTION 1:  DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
 PERSONAL: 
 
1.  How long have you been in the Housing field?  
 
 
 
2.  What is your highest formal qualification? 
 
 
 
3.  What is your status in the Housing Sector? 
 
 
 
 
 85
SECTION 2: MAIN QUESTIONS 
 
 
The Financial Sector Charter, FSC and the Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB are both 
initiatives that target the improvement of low income housing and the availability of low 
income housing financing in South Africa. 
 
1. What is your view of the FSC commitments to low income housing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you think the pre-conditions placed on the government in terms of Section 
8.2.3 and 9.1.3 of the FSC are acceptable? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What is the status of the Memorandum of Understanding MOU signed by the 
Minister of Housing and the banks on 31 March 2005? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. What are the obstacles to finalising this MOU? 
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5. What are your views on the legislation of the CRB and the FSC? 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Which of the two, FSC and CRB in your opinion would provide a better solution 
for the provision of low income housing? 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Would the government reconsider reintroducing the CRB and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
8. How much has been spent by the government towards low income housing since 
1994 till now? 
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9. In your view, what parameters should be considered to determine the successes of 
the FSC and the CRB? 
 
 
 
10. Based on the drafting of the FSC, up to R42bn was intended for the R1500-R7500 
income bracket towards housing to be used up between 2002 and 2008, what is 
the progress thus far? 
 
 
 
 
11. Do you have any additional comments to this topic? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY DOCUMENTS  
 
Questionnaire covering letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Private Bag 3, Wits 2050, South Africa 
 
Mr…………….. 
P.O Box 31287 
Braamfontein 2017 
Fax: (011) 4085112 
            
         15 November 05 
         
Dear Sir, 
 
An Evaluation of the Financial Sector Charter and the Community Reinvestment 
Bill 
 
The view has been widely expressed that, reconciliation between the Financial Sector Charter, FSC and the  
Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB in the form of the Memorandum of Understanding, MOU between the 
private sector and government would provide an ideal solution to the problem of housing and housing 
finance faced by the low income sector in South Africa. This is the premise of a Masters Research study at 
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the University of the Witwatersrand, the outcome of which will benefit immensely the low income sector 
housing market. 
 
To meet the objectives of the research, the attached questionnaire has been carefully designed and pre-
tested among Financial Sector Charter Coalition members, and will take about 25 to 30 minutes to 
complete. A careful selection has been made of reputable members of independent organizations with in-
depth understanding of the research topic, including yours, to participate in the survey. 
 
We therefore request your response to the survey. By responding, you would be making a major and 
expectedly lasting contribution ultimately to the policy implementing officials will assist in addressing the 
significant issues surrounding acquisition of housing finance and housing in the low income sector. Your 
response will also enhance the reliability of the findings of this research. 
 
In return for your participation, we undertake to provide you with an advance summary of the key findings 
of the study and publish the findings in popular media for the property industry. We also undertake to 
respect strictly your anonymity by using your responses only as qualitative data for the research.  
 
May you kindly fax back the questionnaire to the aforementioned fax number. 
 
Thank you in anticipation, for your helpful response. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Edith Nyandoro 
(Researcher) 
Francois Viruly 
(Supervisor) 
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An Evaluation of the Financial Sector Charter and the Community 
Reinvestment Bill 
 
Research survey 
 
By 
Edith Nyandoro 
Faculty of Engineering & the Built Environment, 
University of the Witwatersrand 
 
SECTION 1:  DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
 PERSONAL: 
 
1.  How long have you been in the Housing field?  
 
 
 
2.  What is your highest formal qualification? 
 
 
 
3.  What is your status in the Housing Sector? 
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SECTION 2:  MAIN QUESTIONS  
 
1. Do the Community Reinvestment Bill, CRB and Financial Sector Charter, FSC 
meet their objectives as far as reaching the low income sector in terms of housing 
for the low income sector and what is the potential of doing so dependant upon?           
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What is the progress thus far in meeting of the set financial targets by the FSC; if 
the CRB had been in acted would better results have been obtained presently? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Are the FSC and the CRB appropriate in meeting the needs of the low income 
sector? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. When aid from the CRB and the FSC is withdrawn, can the low income sector 
afford to sustain itself through loan repayments? 
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5. What are other intended results of the FSC and CRB, both beneficial and non-
beneficial to the low income sector? 
 
 
 
 
6. What are the factors affecting the FSC and the CRB performance? 
 
 
 
 
7. Are the FSC and CRB logical and applicable to the situation of availing finance 
for housing and housing to the low income sector? (Are their objectives 
obtainable?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Are there other means of addressing the problem of unavailability of housing 
finance and housing delivery to the low income sector? 
 
 
 
 
 
Any other comments and/or suggestions? (Kindly attach separate sheets, if necessary.): 
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Kindly fax this questionnaire to: 011 339 8175.  Attention:  Ms Edith Nyandoro 
 
Thank you for your time! 
 
 
 
